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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
EVALUATING STATE POLICY INTERVENTIONS FOR OPIOID ABUSE AND DIVERSION:  
THE IMPACT ON CONSUMERS, HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS, AND THE U.S. MARKET FOR 
PRESCRIPTION OPIOIDS 
 
Prescription opioid pain reliever utilization has been increasing since the 
1990s, due in part to changes in recommendations for the treatment of chronic 
pain, but also to abuse and diversion. One innovative policy solution to the abuse 
and diversion of prescription opioids is state prescription drug monitoring 
programs (PDMPs), which provide prescribers and other selected parties with 
patient controlled substance dispensation history; thereby, correcting an 
information asymmetry problem between prescribers and patients.  
The widespread implementation of state PDMPs, which vary in program 
design and requirements, has resulted in a variety of intended and unintended 
consequences. Previous PDMP evaluations have suggested such outcomes as 
the reduction of consumer access to opioids, the influencing of healthcare 
provider prescribing behaviors for opioids, and the re-shaping of the United 
States market for prescription opioids. PDMPs may also be associated with 
unintended outcomes: namely, the restriction of pharmaceutical opioids could be 
associated with an increase in heroin use, as evidenced by increases in heroin 
substance abuse treatment facility discharges. The analyses in this project 
examine the influence of PDMPs on healthcare providers and the market for 
prescription drugs by comparing trends in opioid utilization in states with varying 
PDMP features using Medicaid prescription utilization data and commercial 
insurance claims. The effect of PDMPs on consumers is explored with an 
analysis comparing substance abuse treatment facility discharge data for heroin 
abuse with pharmaceutical opioid prescriptions before and after PDMP regulatory 
change.  Finally, the impact of other related opioid policy interventions, opioid 
overdose medication access laws, are analyzed by comparing opioid overdose 
mortality across states with differing overdose medication access policies over 
time. Contributions to the understanding about the impacts of these state-level 
opioid abuse and diversion policies can be used to improve or amplify intended 
outcomes and ameliorate unintended consequences.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Professional healthcare organizations, government agencies, and law 
enforcement entities have decried the abuse and diversion of prescription opioid 
pain-relievers in the United States as an epidemic.1-3 Prescription drugs in 
general, and opioids in particular, are now the second-most abused substance, 
after marijuana.4 The consequences of opioid abuse and diversion for both public 
safety and public health have lead to novel collaborations and conflicts between 
healthcare providers and law enforcement on the policy front.  
The spread of prescription opioid abuse and diversion has been attributed 
to a host of factors that converged beginning in the late 1990s. The most widely 
blamed of these factors includes the methods in which the medical community 
addresses and manages chronic pain, the introduction of multiple high-strength 
prescription opioid products with aggressive marketing campaigns by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the changing preferences of consumers who 
are more likely to view nonmedical use of prescription medications as “safer” 
alternatives to illicit substance abuse.5 Figure 1.1 illustrates this trend of 
simultaneous increases of visits to primary care providers for non-cancer pain 
and the increasing proportion of those visits resulting in an opioid prescription.6 
An unfortunate side effect of the improvement in access to chronic pain treatment 
has arisen, with reports of nonmedical use of licit prescription opioids and illicit 
heroin substitutes increasing (Figure 1.2),7 particularly in certain populations.   
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Figure 1.1 United States Opioid Prescriptions Resulting from Care for Pain* 
 
Figure 1.2 Past Month Nonmedical Use in United States Adults Aged 18 and 
Over† 
 
                                                     
*
Figure 1.1 created using data tables published by: Daubresse, Chang, et al. (2013) via the 
National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey.  
†
Data source used to create Figure 1.2: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SAMHSA, 
2013. 
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3 
The most encompassing state-level policy innovation to address the 
problems associated with prescription drug abuse and diversion are prescription 
drug monitoring programs (PDMPs), which are state programs that track the 
prescribing and dispensing of controlled prescription substances, such as 
opioids, to individual consumers. The information on consumer controlled 
substance prescription history is made available to authorized users, such as 
healthcare providers or law enforcement officials, through reports generated by 
the PDMP at request and/or through unsolicited automation to the relevant 
parties. State PDMPs have proliferated throughout the nation; as of 2015, all 
states but Missouri and the District of Columbia have operational programs 
(Appendix A contains a list of the current legislative and operational status of all 
state PDMPs).  
The controlled substance prescription data managed by PDMPs mitigates 
a multi-directional problem of information asymmetry: first, between healthcare 
providers and their patients; second, between healthcare providers and law 
enforcement (or regulatory agents such as medical licensure boards); and finally, 
between law enforcement and consumers. This information asymmetry problem, 
however, may not be overcome if relevant parties do not utilize PDMPs. States 
report low PDMP utilization rates by prescribers of controlled substances in 
particular, where states that have conducted evaluations found prescriber PDMP 
utilization below 60 percent when not mandated by law or regulation.8-10  
PDMPs have been accompanied by various supplemental legislation and 
regulations at the state level to boost efforts to combat opioid abuse and 
diversion problems; however, resulting evaluations of PDMPs and these related 
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policy interventions have not reached definitive conclusions.10-15 The scope of 
policy interventions in regards to opioid abuse and diversion is limited throughout 
this dissertation to state PDMPs and state naloxone access laws. Naloxone 
access laws are intended to ease access to the pharmaceutical opioid and/or 
heroin overdose reversal medication named naloxone. Currently, 27 states have 
some type of policy expanding access to naloxone, and 21 of these states 
adopted their policies within the past 3 years.16 Naloxone access policies are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.  
For this dissertation a series of analyses was designed to examine the 
impact of state PDMP policy interventions on consumers, the market for 
prescription drugs, and healthcare providers in the United States. The “real-
world” approach undertaken in this dissertation is conducted using policy variable 
definitions that reflect the actual implementation rather than the presence of 
PDMP features, while the data sources for the empirical analyses have been 
employed to measure PDMP policy intervention outcomes using unique and 
sometimes novel applications.  
Chapters 1 and 2 provide background and rationale for PDMPs as an 
innovative policy solution to the problem of prescription opioid abuse and 
diversion, while orienting variations in state PDMP features in terms of a policy 
theoretical framework. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the effect of PDMP policies on 
state Medicaid beneficiaries (Chapter 3) and claims data from commercially 
insured patients (Chapter 4) by comparing trends in opioid utilization in all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia, which have varying PDMP implementation 
dates and program features. Chapter 5 moves away from analysis of the 
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marketplace for prescription opioids and tackles an unintended consequence for 
restrictions to access and supply of pharmaceutical opioids for consumers: that 
is, a possible relationship between PDMP policy implementation and substance 
abuse treatment discharge rates for heroin. Chapter 6 delves further into the 
possible relationship between PDMPs, pharmaceutical opioid, and heroin 
consumption by examining the impact of another opioid abuse policy 
intervention, state-level naloxone access policies, on opioid overdose mortality in 
all fifty states from 1999 through 2011. Illicit opioids such as heroin will be 
included in the definition of opioid overdose, along with licit prescription opioids. 
The final chapter, Chapter 7, synthesizes the analysis results from the previous 
chapters to inform construction of policy recommendations for PDMPs and 
naloxone access.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
State Policy Interventions for Opioid Abuse and Diversion: 
A Review of the Literature on Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 
 
Chapter Summary: This chapter contains an in-depth accounting of the public health and public 
safety problems associated with prescription controlled substance abuse and diversion. Focus is 
narrowed to prescription opioids and the origins of state PDMPs, which were implemented in 
reaction to abuse and diversion problems. The review process informed the development of three 
emergent themes from the PDMP literature: the influence of PDMPs on consumer health 
outcomes, the impact of PDMPs on the market for controlled substances, and the influence of 
PDMPs on healthcare provider behaviors. Gaps in the literature were identified and several of 
these gaps are addressed in the empirical analyses within following chapters.    
  
 The United States faces two intertwined public health crises: the persistent 
under-treatment of chronic pain conditions,17-19 and the abuse and diversion of 
the controlled substances used to treat chronic pain.1,20 The categorization of 
some prescription drugs, including those used to treat chronic pain, as controlled 
substances began with the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. The Controlled 
Substances Act created a classification system that divided licit and illicit drugs 
with abuse potential into five levels, called Schedules, and charged the Food and 
Drug Administration and the Drug Enforcement Administration with joint 
responsibility for designating substances to this Schedule classification system.21 
Criteria for controlled substance classification and example substances can be 
seen in Table 1.1 below.  
 
Table 1.1 Controlled Substance Scheduling 
Schedule Classification Criteria Examples 
I High abuse potential, no medically acceptable use Heroin, LSD 
II High abuse potential, potential for psychological or physical 
dependence 
Morphine, Oxycodone 
III Some abuse potential, less potential for dependence than II Hydrocodone 
IV Low abuse potential relative to III Diazepam, Alprazolam 
V Low abuse potential relative to IV Cough medicines containing 
Codeine 
 
Advocates for improved pain treatment practices urge caution against the 
adoption of state regulatory actions that influence prescriber practices through 
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fear of scrutiny by pointing out that undertreated chronic pain tends to 
disproportionately affect the economically disadvantaged, women, and 
minorities.19 In response to these public health crises, the Wisconsin Pain and 
Policy Studies Group developed the “Central Principle of Balance”, which calls 
for drug policies and regulations to be evaluated in regards to a dual mission: to 
reduce abuse and diversion while simultaneously supporting medically 
appropriate treatment for pain.22   
One of the major policy innovations proposed to address the problem of 
the abuse and diversion of prescription medications is Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), which are state programs that track the 
prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances to individual consumers. The 
information on consumer controlled substance use history is made available to 
certain health providers or law enforcement officials, depending upon individual 
state program regulations, to serve the dual purpose of addressing the crisis of 
chronically undertreated pain as well as reducing abuse and diversion.23 Though 
states have adopted PDMPs to reduce abuse and diversion within their own 
populations, controlled substance abuse and diversion represents an epidemic 
that is costly to the nation as a whole. A 2009 Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) investigative report into Medicaid fraud and abuse found that Medicaid 
had funded approximately $63 million worth of direct payments for prescriptions 
that were likely due to doctor shopping in 2006 and 2007, including about $2 
million in payments to health care providers that had already been banned from 
prescribing controlled substances.24   
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The GAO estimate does not reflect indirect costs such as medical bills for 
treatment, rehabilitative services, or law enforcement investigations. It was 
recommended that states that had not yet done so adopt PDMPs to combat the 
problem and states that already had implemented PDMPs should encourage 
increased participation by health care professionals. A similar Government 
Accountability Office investigation into Medicare Part D fraud and abuse 
attributed an estimated $148 million in costs due to payments from doctor 
shopping in 2008 alone.25  
Nonmedical use of prescription drugs is most prevalent in rural or 
suburban areas with limited access to cheap illicit drugs, and prescription drugs 
are the second-most class of abused substance, after marijuana.1 Most providers 
perceive “doctor shopping,” which is loosely defined as the process of visiting 
multiple providers with the explicit purpose of obtaining controlled substances, to 
be the primary cause of drug diversion but also express concerns about diversion 
from online retailers.26 This perception is not borne out in reality because 55 
percent of prescription substance abusers report that they obtain prescription 
drugs for free from family and friends and not from doctor shopping or online 
retailers.27 It is important to note, however, that doctor shopping behaviors occur 
for opioid pain relievers more so than for any other class of controlled substance, 
according to prescription tracking patterns observed in California’s PDMP.28 This 
is cause for concern because it is estimated that as many as 90 percent of 
patients undergoing treatment for long-term chronic pain conditions will receive 
prescriptions for the class of controlled substances known as opioids.5   
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 PDMPs and related policies address the legal and public health crises of 
abuse and diversion by combining government authorities and medical practice 
in a novel, and at times controversial, way. The specific aims for this literature 
review are to: 
 describe the origin of PDMPs and related policies; 
 examine the controversial policy issues surrounding PDMPs; 
 evaluate the available evidence for PDMP efficacy; and, 
 analyze the unintended consequences associated with PDMP 
implementation. 
Methods 
 
PubMed, JSTOR, and Google Scholar were used to search for 
combinations of the following keywords and phrases: prescription drug 
monitoring program, PDMP, PMP, controlled substance, opioids, monitoring, and 
health policy. Literature was excluded if the topic lay outside of the scope of the 
specific aims addressed, was published as a “letter to the editor” or opinion 
piece, or was authored before 1999. 
The Origins of PDMPs 
 
In 1914 New York state passed a law that required physicians to use 
duplicate, numbered forms to write prescriptions for certain prescription 
medications, which were collected and stored by the prescribing physician and 
were to be presented on demand to state authorities for inspections.23 It was 
California, however, that instituted the first official PDMP in 1939, which predated 
the federal Controlled Substances Act by over 30 years. The California PDMP 
required physicians to collect records of state-defined controlled substance 
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prescribing using triplicate copies of prescriptions and forward those records to 
public health and law enforcement agencies. Most other states did not adopt 
PDMPs until the 1990s and 2000s and a variety of monitoring strategies have 
since been attempted. As of 2015, 49 states have enacted legislation to create 
PDMPs and 43 of those states have operational programs.29 See Appendix A for 
more information on state PDMP enactment and operation status. 
In a typical, contemporary PDMP, states require dispensers of controlled 
substances (usually pharmacies) to submit electronic or paper reports for each 
substance dispensed within one day to two weeks of dispensing. This data 
transmission process varies across states, but each PDMP grants access to data 
on an individual’s dispensing history to authorized PDMP users only.30 Most 
states with PDMPs grant access to controlled substance user data to prescribers, 
dispensers of controlled substances, licensing authorities, and law enforcement 
officials conducting investigations of potential illicit activities. Every state with a 
PDMP monitors Schedule II controlled substances, but some choose not to 
monitor controlled substances categorized as Schedules III, IV, and V due to less 
perceived risk for abuse potential. Departmental authority varies from state to 
state, but most PDMPs are housed within law enforcement departments, 
departments of public health, boards of pharmacy, or other medical licensure 
boards.31 The variability in state PDMP organization, management, and 
monitoring activities due to competing public health and law enforcement 
missions will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.  
Controversial PDMP Policy Issues 
 
 
11 
PDMP policies frequently blur the boundaries between law enforcement 
investigation and medical privacy because all state PDMPs rely on information 
collected about individual patient dispensing and prescribing history.  There is a 
potential conflict between patient privacy as mandated by the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 due to the possibility of law 
enforcement officials or providers who are not treating the patient accessing 
private patient prescription data.32 The Office of National Drug Control Policy 
dismisses these privacy concerns by maintaining that PDMP records are 
protected similarly to other medical records: “Law enforcement may not access 
patient‐ specific PDMP data unless they have an active investigation, and 
healthcare providers can access only the PDMP data relevant to their patients.”33 
Surveys collected from Virginia physicians, however, revealed that physicians in 
that state mistrust law enforcement with patient data and remain skeptical of the 
level of confidentiality being practiced for patient records and for physician 
prescribing behaviors.8 
State PDMPs have varying regulations for the access to and usage of 
PDMP data. Proactive systems generate reports without solicitation for relevant 
PDMP users when certain thresholds are met, whereas reactive systems require 
PDMP users to request reports about prescribing or dispensing for an individual 
patient’s records. Less than half of state programs currently have both the 
technological capability and legal authority to generate unsolicited reports.34   
Two federal initiatives have been undertaken to promote the 
implementation of state PDMPs: first, the Harold Rogers Prescription Monitoring 
Program grants that were offered through the Department of Justice and second, 
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the National All Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting (NASPER) Act of 
2005, which offers grants through the Department of Health and Human 
Services.35 The NASPER and Harold Rogers grant programs promote slightly 
different missions. The NASPER program initiative originally intended to promote 
uniform security requirements, state interoperability, and nationwide database 
access to approved users, but has since restructured funding incentives to de-
emphasize the original initiatives.5,26 NASPER grants for state PDMPs to start-up 
or expand existing programs now operate alongside the earlier federal program, 
the Harold Rogers Prescription Monitoring Program, which offers grant funding 
for state PDMPs with fewer requirements.32 NASPER was extended through 
2015 and states continue to receive NASPER grants ranging from about $50K- 
$350K to either implement or upgrade state PDMPs, but variations in program 
design are now permitted. This relaxation of NASPER requirements has resulted 
in the implementation of state programs that have few mechanisms for interstate 
information exchange, though the earlier Harold Rogers grant-funded programs 
rarely built-in these mechanisms either.35   
 
Evidence for PDMP Efficacy 
 
Kentucky’s PDMP, the Kentucky All Schedule Prescription Electronic 
Reporting Program (KASPER), was implemented in 1999 and converted to an 
electronically based reporting system in 2005. KASPER is widely regarded as the 
prime example of a successful PDMP and health agencies and health 
professionals continue to advocate for KASPER to remain the national model 
program.31 Comprehensive evaluations of PDMPs have been rare and so a 
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variety of methods have been used to approximate different facets of PDMP 
effectiveness and success.  
The GAO chose to examine KASPER as a case study to measure the 
effectiveness of PDMPs in a 2002 evaluation report by counting the average 
number of days it took law enforcement officials in Kentucky to complete 
investigations of doctor shopping before and after the implementation of 
KASPER. The reduction in days to investigation completion dropped from 156 
days before KASPER was implemented to 16 days after KASPER 
implementation. These findings were used as evidence to support the claim that 
states with PDMPs are successful at reducing drug diversion.32,36   
Though a wide variety of methods have been used to evaluate PDMP 
effectiveness, most fall into a few broad categories: tracking prescribing trends, 
health outcomes and mortality studies, and perceptions of efficacy studies. 
These categories of PDMP studies will be examined in detail in the sections that 
follow.  
 
Tracking Prescribing Trends 
 
  PDMP data can be used to track prescribing and dispensing patterns 
across a state. Massachusetts PDMP data collected between the years of 1996 
through 2006 was used to monitor trends in dispensing patterns and doctor 
shopping. Though less than 1 percent of individuals were found to be engaging in 
doctor shopping, defined here as using services from 4 or more prescribers and 
4 or more pharmacies over the course of one year, those individuals accounted 
for 3.1 percent of all prescriptions for Schedule II opioids.37 Studies that track 
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trends in prescribing to identify doctor shopping have the significant limitation of 
not having a standard definition of doctor shopping to refer to, and so the 
differences in definitions will influence prevalence estimates.  
  Evidence from a 2007 study of California PDMP data found that 12.8 
percent of patients prescribed opioid controlled substances were potentially 
engaging in doctor shopping, which is defined in this study as receiving the same 
prescription from two or more prescribers and filling them at two or more 
pharmacies within a 30 day period.28 Again, this piece highlights the need for a 
standardized definition of doctor shopping because these trend estimates are not 
comparable with those of other studies using different measurement parameters. 
Neither doctor shopping trend study measured prescriber or dispenser use of the 
PDMP nor did they attempt to measure a relationship between PDMP usage and 
doctor shopping trends. Continued tracking of California PDMP data after minor 
regulatory changes (moving from triplicate prescription forms to security 
prescription forms in 2005) revealed that the policy change was correlated with 
an increase in doctor shopping behaviors for opioid Schedule II controlled 
substances over time.38 These trends conflict with evidence from other PDMPs 
about possible substitution effects that would have predicted a decrease in 
Schedule II opioid controlled substance prescriptions and an increase in 
Schedule III opioid controlled substance prescriptions. Schedule III opioid 
controlled substances were not tracked in this particular analysis and so 
speculation about substitution effects is not possible. The California study also 
points out that variability in program design may have significant impacts on the 
behavior of prescribers. 
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 A study by Han et al. (2012) sought to explore what characteristics of a 
consumer and county could be related to doctor shopping in an analysis that 
loosely defined doctor shopping as receiving an opioid prescription from multiple 
prescribers and pharmacies during 2006.39 Younger, female patients who 
obtained prescriptions for Schedule III opioids in counties with high prescriber 
availability and lower median income were found to be the most likely candidates 
for obtaining opioid prescriptions from multiple providers. It should be noted that 
this study fails to rule out the low likelihood of “malicious” intent doctor shopping 
incidents because all patients with more than one prescription from a second 
provider are assumed doctor shoppers, when in reality this may reflect the 
disjointed care provided by specialists and primary providers in our healthcare 
system rather than an intention to seek opioids for abuse. 
A 2010 study measured the impact of Ohio’s PDMP using a combination 
of physician surveys and observations as well as medical record review. The 
primary outcome of this study was to determine if emergency department 
physicians changed their initial treatment plan after viewing a patient’s controlled 
substance history report. It was found that 41 percent of treatment management 
plans were changed after the prescriber saw a report and 61 percent of those 
changed resulted in fewer or no opioid medications being prescribed to the 
patient being treated.40 Unfortunately, this study examined a small group of 
patients (n=179) treated by an even smaller group of physicians (n~4) and 
restricted the observations to exclude acute pain conditions. Physicians being 
prompted via survey about their anticipated use of a patient PDMP report may 
have unduly influenced their decision to order a report, particularly since the lead 
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author of the piece himself treated approximately one-third of the sample patients 
included in the study.   
A simple comparison of trends in nationwide prescription claims data 
revealed that counties located in states with PDMPs have lower overall insurance 
claims for opioid analgesics, though it is unclear if the PDMP is the cause of 
lowered claims or if that is even a desirable outcome.41 It is also unknown 
whether the observed reduction in claims for opioids reflects a reduction in 
treatments for legitimate medical need or reduction in illicit use. Tracking 
prescription trends provides useful information about patterns of prescription drug 
use over time, but these studies do not offer much in the way of determining 
PDMP effectiveness. 
 
Health Outcomes Studies  
 
An intuitive approach for measuring the efficacy of PDMPs is to look at 
health outcomes data in states with and without the programs. Because state 
PDMP data is limited to prescribing history and not complete medical history, 
other means of measuring health outcomes have been used to estimate PDMP 
influence. Two health outcomes that are tracked at the national level with publicly 
available data sources are substance abuse treatment admissions and drug 
overdose mortality. Researchers have taken advantage of this data availability 
and most PDMP evaluations that take a health outcomes approach define either 
overdose mortality or substance abuse treatment data to be the primary indicator 
of PDMP effectiveness.  
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A comparison between states with and without PDMPs found that 
substance abuse patients in states with PDMPs were less likely to seek 
substance abuse treatment for prescription opioid abuse than patients seeking 
substance abuse treatment in states without PDMPs (OR=0.775, 95% CI 0.764-
0.785).42 Another study examining substance abuse treatment admissions 
yielded similar results, finding that the presence of proactive state PDMPs led to 
a reduced supply of Schedule II controlled substances and a lower likelihood of 
substance abuse treatment admission due to prescription drug abuse.11 Both of 
these pieces surmise that the reduction in Schedule II controlled substance 
availability was the likely reason for the decreased odds of opioid treatment 
admissions. 
Prescription drug overdoses disproportionately affect men, middle-aged 
adults, and persons who identify as white/Caucasian and American Indian or 
Native American.43 Residents of rural counties are nearly twice as likely to 
overdose on prescription drugs as urban residents.43 Several studies have been 
conducted using mortality from prescription drug overdose as the determinant of 
PDMP efficacy. For example, an in-depth examination of West Virginia 
prescription drug overdose deaths in 2006 found that 93.2 percent of fatalities 
were caused in total or in part by opioid analgesics.44 This study used a 
combination of PDMP data, law enforcement data, and records of death to 
determine that men who died as a result of overdose were more likely to have 
obtained prescription opioids via diversion whereas women were more likely to 
have obtained prescription opioids via doctor shopping, which they defined as 
receiving prescriptions for controlled substances from five or more health care 
 
18 
practitioners in a year. Though this study does not claim to evaluate PDMPs 
directly, this was one of the first uses of PDMP data to track and measure doctor 
shopping outside of the context of law enforcement.  
More recent analyses of mortality data have taken different approaches. A 
2010 study provided an in-depth case study comparison between Pennsylvania 
and New York drug overdose mortality rates between the years of 1994 and 
2006.45 The authors offered the differences in the state PDMP characteristics as 
a plausible explanation for Pennsylvania’s much larger opioid consumption and 
drug overdose mortality rates. New York uses tamper-resistant prescription pads 
and has a dedicated staff for monitoring suspicious activity, whereas 
Pennsylvania does not have these PDMP program features. Though the 
differences in population distribution between urban and rural residents are 
noted, this is not offered as a possible explanation for the disparities between the 
two states’ overdose mortalities. Pennsylvania’s population is substantially more 
rural (50 percent) than New York’s (25 percent) and according to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, rural residents are statistically significantly more 
likely to die of prescription drug overdoses than urban residents.43 Future 
research comparing mortality data across states should factor in this key 
difference in state characteristics or should construct a model of state fixed 
effects. 
Paulozzi and colleagues expanded upon the methods for investigating 
prescription overdose mortality by developing a research design that allowed for 
empirical comparisons between all states. Specifically, the effects of PDMPs on 
opioid overdose-related mortality and overall opioid consumption were measured 
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using a combination of data from PDMPs, mortality data from all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia, and publicly available data on prescription drug sales for 
1999 through 2005.34 It was found that states with PDMPs did not have 
significantly lower rates of opioid overdose mortality, even when controlling for 
states with proactive PDMP reports versus retroactive PDMP reports. Despite 
carefully controlling for geographic proximity between states with and without 
PDMPs, this study failed to control for the variability in other program design 
features.  
Green and colleagues take issue with Paulozzi and colleagues’ analysis of 
one element in program variability across states; specifically, they point out that 
differences in health care practitioner access to PDMP reports are not 
addressed.46 Green and colleagues contend that five of the nineteen state 
PDMPs examined by Paulozzi and colleagues prohibit health care practitioner 
access to PDMP reports and another six states do not require any health care 
practitioner participation. Several of the remaining states in the original analysis 
report low utilization of PDMPs from health care practitioners, so the evidence 
presented that established a link between PDMPs and overdoses is weak.  
Kerlikowskie echoes criticisms of the lack of provider utilization data in Paulozzi 
and colleagues’ analysis, but also points out that NASPER funding and electronic 
system upgrades represent major improvements in PDMP capabilities as tools 
for clinicians.47  
Neither criticism offers suggestions for alternative model specifications, 
but a natural next step for improving Paulozzi’s research design could be to 
compare the overdose mortality rates at smaller units of analysis. An analysis of 
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PDMP use by practitioners at the county level may help tease out the effects on 
overdose mortality rates in counties where the practitioner PDMP utilization is 
high versus counties with similar demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
where practitioner PDMP use is low, assuming it is possible to convince state 
PDMPs to share practitioner utilization data.  
An innovative approach to identifying PDMP effect on opioid overdose 
was taken by Reifler et al. (2012) by utilizing Poison Control Center call data that 
identified intentional and unintentional opioid exposures by consumers, rather 
than mortality data.15 Reifler attempted to analyze differences in PDMP 
regulatory features by constructing indicators for “superior” and “standard” 
PDMPs, where superior PDMPs were defined as monitoring Schedule II-IV 
substances and duration of implementation since 2002. She concluded that 
PDMPs effectively reduced intentional opioid exposures (0.2 percent versus 1.9 
percent total exposures by quarter for states with/without PDMP, p=0.036); 
however, the characterization of PDMPs as superior or standard failed to 
generate evidence of an influence of these programmatic features on Poison 
Control Center call volume or on substance abuse treatment admissions. 
Survey Studies: Perceptions of Efficacy 
Some states do not require prescriber participation in PDMPs and therefor 
many physicians may be unaware of the programs or how to use them, 
according to surveys conducted in Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio.8-10 Feldman and 
colleague’s survey study of Ohio physicians found that 84 percent of physicians 
were aware of Ohio’s PDMP, but only 58.8 percent of physicians had ever used 
the database five years after the program had been implemented.9 Of those 
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physicians who reported using Ohio’s PDMP, 93.6 percent had altered their 
prescribing behavior as a result of viewing a patient report. This study only looks 
at physicians working in a single academic medical center in Ohio, so the results 
reflect the perceptions and opinions of physicians in a narrow context.  
Ohio pharmacists expressed usage similar to that of physicians for their 
state PDMP.  About 62 percent of Ohio community pharmacists who participated 
in a survey in 2010 reported that they used their state PDMP (n=1,434).48 Among 
those who did not use the PDMP, their primary reasons for not doing so included 
a lack of Internet access, slow reporting times, and time to register for the PDMP. 
Pharmacists that had received information about the PDMP from continuing 
education training were more likely to be registered users of the PDMP than 
pharmacists who had not received information. The Ohio studies point to an 
important lesson for states implementing PDMPs: it is difficult (and perhaps not 
worthwhile) to measure PDMP effectiveness if the intended primary users, 
physicians and pharmacists, are not using the program. 
The evaluation of Kentucky’s PDMP included an analysis of prescriber, 
pharmacist, and law enforcement perceptions of PDMP effectiveness.10 All three 
groups report overwhelming agreement that Kentucky’s PDMP is effective at 
reducing prescription drug abuse and diversion: prescribers-95.8 percent, 
pharmacists-92.8 percent, and law enforcement officials- 93.1 percent.  While 
law enforcement officials and pharmacists report a high degree of usage of the 
PDMP, 64.0 percent of controlled substance prescribers in Kentucky did not have 
a registered KASPER account at the time of program evaluation.  A related study 
has examined the perception of KASPER from the Medicaid consumer/patient 
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perspective.49 It was found that Medicaid patients are generally unaware of 
KASPER, but patients diagnosed with chronic pain conditions are more likely to 
report that a physician discussed their KASPER report with them than patients 
that have not been diagnosed with chronic pain conditions. Chronic pain patients 
were also more likely to report trouble getting a prescription for controlled 
substances, but not significantly more likely to experience problems filling a 
prescription at a pharmacy. 
The Wisconsin Pain and Policy Studies Group developed a state PDMP 
and pain treatment evaluation method that grades individual state programs from 
A to F based solely upon the language contained in state regulations.22 Report 
cards are released every three years, beginning in 2000, and states are assigned 
grades based upon how well their regulations adhere to the Principle of Balance 
by providing medically current definitions for treatments and disease states, while 
avoiding prohibitive limits on medical practitioners’ discretion to write 
prescriptions for controlled substances. This report card approach addresses 
potential conflicts in the language of state regulations, but does not serve to 
evaluate the performance of the PDMPs in a direct, empirical way.  
Gaps in the Research 
 
Fishman recommends aggregating data from multiple state PDMPs to 
analyze health outcomes, but cautions that the variability in program regulations 
and operations would make any analysis of current program data unlikely to pick 
up on the successful attributes of a program.12 This incompatibility between state 
program measures could be ameliorated if states were to agree on a nationwide 
list of controlled substances to monitor via their PDMPs and move towards 
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adopting more similar program features. The failure of NASPER to require state 
interoperability is quite the hindrance to measuring national PDMP effectiveness.  
A significant proportion of the studies examined in this paper use the 
Department of Justice’s Automation of Reports and Consolidated Order System 
(ARCOS) data to track controlled substance sales and the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration’s Treatment Episode Datasets (TEDS) to 
track substance abuse treatment. These two data sources present researchers 
with several limitations.  For example, ARCOS data does not provide any 
evidence of illicit drug purchasing or licit interstate purchasing that individuals 
transport across borders. The ARCOS data is also unable to capture the specific 
intended indication for each dispensed drug.50 Substance abuse treatment 
admissions data (TEDS) is limited in capturing only those individuals who choose 
to seek inpatient treatment for substance abuse in facilities that receive at least 
some public funding.51 States with higher poverty rates may not have their 
substance abuse populations adequately represented if a smaller proportion of 
individuals with substance abuse problems from those states seek inpatient 
treatment. Variation in state drug court policies may also impact court-ordered 
substance abuse treatment admissions. 
Brushwood points out that previous methods of determining PDMP 
efficacy largely focus on reducing drug diversion and pay little heed to 
determining whether PDMPs have an impact on reducing drug abuse.13 Drug 
abuse, in itself a concept difficult to measure, has often been operationalized as 
drug overdose deaths or treatment sought for overdose. Limitations associated 
with using these particular outcomes as the indicator for effectiveness have 
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already been discussed and it is clear that researchers are in need of more 
comprehensively defined, standard indicators of health outcomes in order to 
evaluate PDMPs using these methods.  
Healthcare providers and the public have expressed skepticism that 
PDMPs are effective tools for reducing drug abuse and diversion due to 
perceived doctor shopping in areas bordering states that do not have PDMPs.23 
Law enforcement agencies, however, cite evidence of increased prosecutions for 
criminal offenses of diversion and doctor shopping in states that have PDMPs to 
argue that state border trafficking is not a significant weakness of PDMPs.52 Law 
enforcement agencies have more resources to build cases when using PDMP 
data, but interstate exchange of PDMP data is still limited. The capability to 
exchange information with other state health providers should be incorporated 
into future evaluations of PDMP efficacy.   
Unintended Consequences 
 
 The implementation of PDMPs may lead to unintended consequences. 
The unintended consequence that has drawn the most concern from 
communities of health professionals is the phenomenon known as the “chilling 
effect”, which is the change in prescriber treatment practices as a response to a 
perceived threat of prosecution or investigation.10 Another unintended 
consequence, the possibility of a substitution effect of lower Scheduled controlled 
substances for higher Scheduled controlled substances, was unanticipated 
before program implementation but may be related to the chilling effect. What 
follows is a discussion of the evidence collected thus far about both of these 
consequences of PDMP implementation. 
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Chilling Effect Evidence 
 
Physicians and physician interest groups in states that implement PDMPs 
have sometimes expressed concerns that their medically legitimate treatment of 
patients with chronic pain conditions will be flagged in electronic systems that 
monitor prescribing patterns.53 Some academicians and health care providers 
have criticized law enforcement organizations like the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) of being overtly dismissive of the possibility that PDMPs cause a barrier to 
access. One paper accuses the DEA as responding “…with sarcasm to the 
suggestion of a chilling effect...referring with disbelief to what it describes as the 
’alleged’ chilling effect.”13 
The majority of research conducted with the explicit intent of measuring a 
chilling effect associated with PDMP implementation has been survey studies. 
Physicians in several states have been asked about their actual prescribing 
habits as well as their perceptions of PDMP influence on those habits. Survey 
questions about regulatory pressures reveal that physicians in various specialties 
from across the United States are fairly unconcerned with pressure to prescribe 
fewer opioids for chronic pain treatment, though physicians in states with PDMP-
like programs expressed greater comfort with prescribing opioids long term.54 A 
survey of Ohio physicians is in agreement with these national survey results, as 
30 percent report feeling less concerned about prescribing controlled substances 
as a result of viewing patient reports, and a few of these physicians (14 percent) 
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expressed feeling more comfortable increasing the quantity prescribed after 
viewing a patient’s report.9  
A survey of physician attitudes of Virginia’s PDMP found that a small 
minority of physicians (about 5 percent) reported a decreased ability to treat 
chronic pain due to the implementation of a PDMP. However, more physicians 
(about 36 percent) reported a general decrease in prescribing of controlled 
substances for other reasons, such as media attention and increased law 
enforcement actions.8 This piece surveyed a small group of Virginia physicians 
about initial perceptions of the PDMP and because more than half of the survey 
sample (52 percent) had never heard of the PDMP before receiving the survey, a 
follow-up study to report any changes in perception or use would be useful. 
Interestingly, while the consensus from these prescriber survey studies is that 
prescribers like having access to the PDMP data about their patients, there is not 
much enthusiasm reported by prescribers for confronting a patient when the data 
indicates cause for concern.55 
Fass and Hardigan contend that pharmacists are the health care providers 
most affected by the implementation of PDMPs, due to the required reporting of 
controlled substance dispensing by pharmacists. Their survey of Florida 
pharmacists conducted in the months immediately prior to the implementation of 
Florida’s much-anticipated PDMP found that pharmacists across all practice 
settings (hospital, independent, chain, or other type of pharmacy) generally 
disagree with the notion that a PDMP will discourage or prevent them from 
dispensing controlled substances (total n=836, 59.0 percent).56 In this survey 
study, pharmacists also expressed strong support of PDMP implementation (78.6 
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percent) and, on average, disagreed with statements expressing concerns that a 
PDMP is an invasion of patient privacy (73.6 percent).  
Substitution Effect 
 
There is some evidence that physicians in states with PDMPs have opted 
to substitute the prescribing of Schedule II controlled substances (like 
oxycodone) with Schedule III drugs such as hydrocodone.  Analysis of 
prescription drug shipments using the Automation of Reports and Consolidated 
Order Systems (ARCOS) database, revealed that states with PDMPs received 
fewer shipments of oxycodone but received shipments of hydrocodone at an 
increasing rate from 1997 to 2003.42 ARCOS data also indicates that states 
without PDMPs experienced the opposite trend during this time- an increasing 
rate of oxycodone shipments and a decreasing rate of hydrocodone shipments. 
Substitution of a higher Scheduled drug for a lower Scheduled drug has not been 
put forward as evidence for the chilling effect, but it certainly represents a change 
in prescriber behavior.  Further analysis of ARCOS data through 2006 indicates a 
continuation in the trend that the substitution effect between Scheduled II 
controlled substances for Schedule II controlled substances of opioid pain 
relievers continues to occur in states with PDMPs.57   
Other types of controlled substances have been shown to experience 
similar decreases in use in states with PDMPs.  A study comparing New York 
and New Jersey’s Medicaid utilization of benzodiazepines after New York 
implemented a triplicate prescription program indicated that the program 
implementation was correlated with a significant decrease in benzodiazepine 
use.58 In this particular study, possible benzodiazepine substitutes did not 
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experience statistically significant increases in utilization, but benzodiazepine 
substitutes were narrowly defined. 
Conclusion 
 
In 2006, Manchikanti described state PDMPs as failures for over-
emphasizing law enforcement goals while neglecting to include more proactive 
tools that would give health providers the information necessary to make clinical 
decisions to reduce doctor shopping and diversion.5 He also points out that the 
highly variable program design across states has slowed the already flagging 
NASPER initiative, whose budget restrictions and reprioritizations have 
contributed to the sluggish development of an interoperable system across 
states.5,31 These allegations of over-emphasis on law enforcement activities may 
ring true: chronic pain conditions continue to be under-treated. Estimates of the 
annual cost of chronic pain conditions in the United States range from $100 
billion to $635 billion in treatments and lost productivity, due to the persistent 
under-treatment of these conditions.17,18  
A visual comparison of opioid substance abuse treatment admission 
trends by state, between the year 2000 and 2010 can be found in Appendix B. 
These trends map national TEDS data and show that, despite the 
implementation of PDMPs, the abuse of controlled substances (and opioids in 
particular) is still on the rise, but PDMPs may have slowed the rate of these 
increasing opioid abuse and diversion trends. The available literature is currently 
unable to provide a definitive answer, but emerging program evaluations are 
providing states with evidence that will be useful in making program design 
decisions.
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Policy Variation in Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Across States: 
A Policy Solution to an Information Asymmetry Problem 
 
Chapter Summary: The objective of this chapter is to identify an appropriate theoretical 
framework to operationalize PDMP policy variation across states. The research design included 
an analysis of state-level regulatory and PDMP program variation, and exploration of a theoretical 
framework using evidence from policy implementation and economics literature to explain the 
process of PDMP feature diffusion across states and their projected variable outcome on PDMP 
effectiveness. This process informed the operationalization of independent variables and 
covariates employed throughout the following empirical chapters, which are defined and justified 
here. It is hypothesized that certain PDMP program features and regulations (e.g., mandatory 
prescriber registration, required inclusion of Schedule III and Schedule IV controlled substance 
reporting) have greater impact on the efficacy of PDMPs than other program features and 
regulations.  
 
The public health and public safety crises associated with the abuse and 
diversion of certain prescription drugs, known as controlled substances, may best 
be framed as a problem of information asymmetry. State Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) have been implemented by most states to correct 
the information asymmetry problem by maintaining databases of consumer 
controlled substance prescribing and dispensing information. PDMPs as a policy 
solution address asymmetric information across multiple parties: between the 
consumers and prescribers/dispensers of controlled substances, between the 
regulatory agents (such as licensing boards) and prescribers/dispensers of 
controlled substances, and between the consumers and law enforcement agents.  
The official objectives of state PDMPs are stated similarly: to reduce drug 
abuse and diversion while maintaining access to controlled substances in the 
case of legitimate medical need. The means to those ends, however, varies 
across states in terms of policy structure as well as in implementation strategy. 
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PDMP Adoption Varies Due to Funding Streams and Focusing Events 
 
 The two federal funding sources that incentivize state PDMP adoption are 
the Harold Rogers grant and the National Association for State Prescription 
Electronic Reporting (NASPER). Both of these grant programs require states to 
adopt certain PDMP program characteristics in exchange for funding, but the 
scope and stated mission for these grant programs differ. NASPER, which was 
adopted as federal law in 2005 and modeled after Kentucky’s state PDMP, 
initially required state PDMPs to adopt programs that would be interoperable and 
standardized to promote interstate exchange of PDMP information.26  
The NASPER program’s mission is to identify patients at risk for abuse 
and is administered via the Department of Health and Human Services, whereas 
the older (2002) Harold Rogers program offers smaller “no strings attached” 
grants in order to encourage states to address drug abuse and diversion 
problems at the first warning signs of prescription drug abuse epidemics.32 The 
NASPER program characteristic requirements are slightly less restrictive than the 
Department of Justice-operated Harold Rogers program, whose stated 
requirements include contingencies upon grant acceptance that permit law 
enforcement agents and officials at the local, state, and the federal government 
level access to state PDMP data during investigations.35 
 California’s 1939 PDMP was the policy innovator, but most states did not 
adopt PDMP-type monitoring policies until the 1990s/2000s. The sudden spike in 
policy adoption likely occurred as a response to public attention and concern 
about the rise in public health and legal problems related to prescription drug 
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abuse. A singular “focusing event”, which can be described as a dramatic and 
sudden issue (e.g., a natural disaster) that captivates immediate public 
attention,59,60 is unlikely to be pinpointed for drawing public attention to 
prescription drug abuse problems. However, a surge of abuse resulting in 
deaths, addiction, and incarcerations that arose in rural areas in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s and quickly spread throughout the United States was the likely 
impetus for the opening of a policy window. It is also possible that high-profile 
celebrity deaths due to prescription drug overdose during this time contributed to 
this sustained wave of focus that captured the attention of the public.   
The flood of policy adopters in the 1990s/2000s was followed by a handful 
of “laggards” who have mostly adopted, but have yet to implement, a PDMP. This 
implementation pattern illustrates the 5-stage model of diffusion as described by 
Rogers (1995) very well.61 Figure 2.1 below shows the bell-curve implementation 
by each wave, classified by time of implementation.  
Figure 2.1 The Diffusion of State PDMP Policies, 1939-2013 
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Variations in PDMP Policy Features 
 
One policy variation often invoked in PDMP evaluations across states is 
the authorities in which state PDMPs are housed. Several states house PDMP 
programs within Departments of Health and Human Services or health provider 
licensing agencies that focus on a public health mission, whereas other states 
house PDMP programs within law enforcement agencies, which tend to 
emphasize the goal of reducing prescription drug diversion. PDMP evaluations 
and studies have failed to produce evidence that this particular attribute has lead 
to differences in outcomes and program effectiveness. For this reason, a variable 
for housing authority was not operationalized.  
Another policy variation is the classification of controlled substances into 
Schedules by some state authorities that compete with the federal drug Schedule 
classification system. Conflicting state and federal Scheduling classifications may 
be a regulatory challenge for developing a national model for PDMP regulations 
in regards to a handful of substances. For example, Mississippi classifies 
pseudoephedrine, which is a precursor substance in the illicit production of 
methamphetamine, as a Schedule III controlled substance62 but 
pseudoephedrine is not Scheduled as a controlled substance at the federal level. 
Most PDMPs require the dispenser of controlled substances, typically a 
pharmacist, to submit a record of that activity to the PDMP within a defined 
timeframe. In early PDMPs the timeframe was established as monthly, biweekly, 
or weekly, but current trends in PDMP regulatory change have shifted data 
transmission times closer to the time of transaction between pharmacy and 
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consumer. Significant policy variation then occurs with what state programs 
choose to do with the data that had been transmitted from pharmacies 
(dispensers) to the PDMP database. Some states, for example, have enacted 
compulsory program registration of dispensers and prescribers of controlled 
substances. Others require participation on the part of the dispenser, but not the 
prescriber, and the latest trend diffusing across state PDMPs is mandating 
PDMP use by prescribers for defined circumstances before a controlled 
substance prescription can be written.  
States with proactive PDMPs send unsolicited reports of controlled 
substance use histories to prescribers, dispensers, and/or law enforcement 
officials, while other states require all or some of these users to request a report 
for each individual patient.29 The proactive reports, however, vary considerably in 
content by state as well as which PDMP user (or groups of PDMP users) receive 
the reports. There is some evidence to suggest that pharmacists are more likely 
to view their PDMP user role as limited to the providers of data, leaving the 
treatment decisions involving data found in a patient’s PDMP report to 
prescribers.  
Most states that have adopted PDMPs grant law enforcement agencies 
access to PDMP data, but the extent of that access varies substantially across 
states. Registered law enforcement officials in most states with PDMPs have 
access to trend analysis of controlled substance prescribing and dispensing. The 
variation occurs in how a state handles access to an individual’s controlled 
substance prescription history. Some states require warrants, court orders, or 
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subpoenas before law enforcement is granted access to an individual’s controlled 
substance history,29 while other states allow more permissive access by law 
enforcement. Federal agencies, namely the DEA, cite precedent of related health 
data regulations that permit them to access data if pursuing an active 
investigation. These regulations have recently caused legal conflicts between 
state PDMPs with more restrictive patient privacy protections and the DEA.63  
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the key policy variations in state PDMPs 
discussed above. Data was acquired from state statutes or codified laws and 
represents the frequency of PDMP characteristics as they were in December 
2013.                 
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  Table 2.1 Summary of Variations in State PDMP Policies* as of 2013 
Policy Policy Characteristics (n = number of states) 
Housing Agency Public Health Agency (38) Law Enforcement Agency 
(6) 
Other Agency (5) No legislation (1) 
Proactive Reporting Yes, to medical providers and 
law agencies (27) 
Yes, to medical providers 
only (7) 
Yes, to law and 
regulatory 
agencies only (8) 
No, no proactive 
reporting or no 
legislation (8) 
Law Enforcement Access to 
Reports 
Yes, with search warrant or 
active investigation (46) 
Yes, under restricted 
circumstances (2) 
No access (1) No legislation (1) 
Compulsory Registration  Prescribers and Dispensers 
(13) 
Prescribers Only (2) Not Compulsory 
(34) 
No legislation (1) 
Dispenser Reporting 
Frequency  
Daily or more frequently (8) From 2 to 7 days (33) Bi-weekly or less 
frequently (7) 
Not specified or no 
legislation (2) 
Interstate Data Sharing Sharing with other PDMPs and 
users in other states (18) 
Sharing with users in other 
states only (8) 
Sharing with other 
PDMPs only (18) 
No sharing or no 
legislation (6) 
Compulsory Prescriber Use Required access under certain 
circumstances (14) 
Access never required 
(35) 
No legislation (1)  
Schedules Monitored II only, or II and III only (4) II through IV only (16) II through V  (29) No legislation (1)  
   *Data obtained from each state’s PDMP statutes and regulations. 
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Operationalizing and Defining PDMP Independent Variables 
 
 Table 2.2 provides the list of PDMP features operationalized as indicator 
variables that will be employed throughout the empirical analyses in the following 
chapters as independent variables. The presence of an operational PDMP has 
been defined in previous literature as the year or date of implementation. The 
simplicity of that definition, though appealing, was found to be lacking an 
important caveat: PDMPs that have been categorized in previous literature as 
operational were in many instances collecting data but were unable to provide 
their authorized users access to that data. In one state, there was found to be a 
gap of six years between the traditionally defined ‘operational’ time (where the 
PDMP was receiving data transmissions and had developed storage 
architecture) but was not providing reports to users. This change in variable 
definition represents a substantial departure from previous PDMP evaluations. 
 Next, it was determined that the two primary user groups of PDMP reports 
should receive their own indicator variables for the presence of proactive 
reporting. States that transmit patient controlled substance history records to 
prescribers and/or law enforcement officials are classified as proactive states. 
Previous PDMP studies have required that both of these groups or other groups 
(such as licensing boards and pharmacists) also receive unsolicited reporting to 
qualify as proactive. This new definition allows for more specificity of report use 
because prescribers and law enforcement officials utilize the PDMP data with 
different missions in mind. This definition is more permissive of variation in state 
policy, which can be seen in the exclusion of several states in previous 
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definitions of proactive in the literature because those states only send proactive 
reports to law enforcement officials. 
 The law enforcement access variable is defined in this series of projects 
as states that provide records to law enforcement agencies and officials pursuant 
to any active investigation. This means that states that require warrants, court 
orders, or subpoenas before PDMP report transmission are not classified as 
having open law enforcement access by this definition. This topic is a recent 
point of concern and so has not been explored in other PDMP studies. 
 States have only recently begun moving towards compulsory registration 
with the PDMP and compulsory prescriber use of PDMP data and so other 
PDMP studies have not incorporated these definitions into their PDMP descriptor 
variables. Eventually, further expansion of this variable definition will be 
necessary because enough states will have passed compulsory prescriber use 
mandates. Expansions of the definition will need to distinguish between states 
that require use in all primary care controlled substance prescription writing 
situations, states that limit required use to timed intervals, and states that further 
limit required use to specialist care. At the time of this project, few states had any 
compulsory prescriber use mandates so all variations of this policy were defined 
as meeting the criteria for compulsory prescriber use when coding variables. 
 Previous PDMP studies that control for a state’s ability to share data with 
other PDMPs have generously defined interoperability as states that have the 
authority and willingness to share interstate data, but this project narrows the 
scope of the variable definition to those states that actively transmit across state 
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lines. It should be noted that functional interstate sharing will likely increase now 
that formal efforts have been undertaken to centralize data-sharing.64 
 The variable for frequent data transmission from pharmacies to PDMPs is 
defined as states that require the uploading of dispensing data in less than one 
week after the dispensing event. Data transmission frequency has not been used 
as a variable in many PDMP evaluations. The Schedules monitored by the state 
PDMP are often used in PDMP evaluations and so are included as individual 
indicator variables in these analyses. It should be noted that federal Scheduling 
is assumed in these variable definitions of “Schedules monitored.”  
Table 2.2 PDMP Features Variables, Derived from Review of PDMP Documentation 
PDMP Variable Description 
Operational PDMP The state has implemented a PDMP AND its data are 
accessible to approved users (prescribers, pharmacists, or law 
enforcement agents) 
Proactive PDMP: 
Prescribers 
Unsolicited patient controlled substance history reports are 
generated and transmitted to prescribers  
Proactive PDMP: Law 
Enforcement 
Unsolicited patient controlled substance history reports OR 
prescriber/dispensing history are generated and transmitted to 
law enforcement agents 
Law Enforcement Access The state PDMP records are accessible to registered law 
enforcement agents without a warrant, court order, or subpoena 
Compulsory Registration The state requires that prescribers and pharmacists register with 
the PDMP 
Compulsory Prescriber Use The state requires that prescribers access patient PDMP 
records at some defined interval or at the point-of-care 
Interstate Data Sharing The state has the authority to AND actively transmits data to 
other state PDMPs and/or authorized users in other states 
Pharmacy Transmission 
Frequency: <1 Week 
The state requires all pharmacies to transmit controlled 
substance dispensing records to the PDMP at least once per 
week or more frequently 
Schedule II Monitored The state uses the PDMP to monitor the prescribing and 
dispensing of Schedule II controlled substances 
Schedule III Monitored The state uses the PDMP to monitor the prescribing and 
dispensing of Schedule III controlled substances 
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Table 2.2 continued, PDMP Features Variables, Derived from Review of PDMP 
Documentation 
PDMP Variable Description 
Schedule IV Monitored The state uses the PDMP to monitor the prescribing and 
dispensing of Schedule IV controlled substances 
Schedule V Monitored The state uses the PDMP to monitor the prescribing and 
dispensing of Schedule V controlled substances 
Unscheduled Substances 
Monitored 
The state uses the PDMP to monitor the prescribing and 
dispensing of non-controlled substances (e.g., 
pseudoephedrine) 
 
Implications of PDMP Regulatory Variation 
 
While several states currently require certain groups (typically prescribers 
and dispensers) to register with the PDMP, very few states currently require use 
of the PDMP data in prescribing or for treatment decisions.65 Compulsory use of 
the PDMP may force non-governmental actors, such as healthcare providers, to 
take on the role of a street-level administrator of policy (i.e., substitute “policing” 
of abuse and diversion in the absence of a law enforcement investigation). This 
new role of the provider may be uncomfortable for both providers and consumers 
and may decrease consumer confidence and trust in providers, which could 
result in worsened health outcomes for consumers who reluctantly share 
information with their provider.  
The variation in state PDMP housing authority also has interesting 
implications about the tacit approval to grant power to non-elected bureaucratic 
agencies that, in effect, create policy. These implications are particularly 
noticeable when PDMPs are housed by auxiliary government agencies, such as 
professional licensing boards, which have limited public input and operational 
transparency but have the ability to impose binding regulations on licensees that 
influence the availability of treatment options to the public. The phenomenon of 
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policy-making bureaucratic agencies has been referred to as the “4th branch of 
government”66 and it is unclear whether this policy-making role is appropriate for 
these agencies due to limited opportunities to incorporate the checks and 
balances built in to the primary branches of government. 
State level agencies that operate PDMPs may also be susceptible to 
external political influences. Brudney and Herbert (1987) examined external 
political influence on a collection of agencies at the state level and found that 
unlike federal agencies, clientele groups and professional associations were 
found to have (overall) less significant influence on state agencies than the 
governor and the state legislature.67 Influence on state agencies was measured 
by surveying agency heads directly and the self-report nature of this measure is 
potentially problematic. It may behoove agency heads to under-report influence 
from external interest groups, by intention or by genuine inability to estimate their 
influence. This is particularly concerning in the case of PDMPs because 
Congressional staff self-report that the pharmaceutical industry’s most prominent 
lobbying force, PhRMA, is the most influential interest group in health policy.68  
Later analyses of political actor influence on agencies conceptualized 
influence in a more objective fashion, by measuring quantifiable federal agency 
outputs. Congress, the president, and other political actors may exert political 
influence on the bureaucracy using more indirect means. Balla and Wright (2001) 
explored one of these other avenues of political control: congressionally 
appointed advisory committees.69 The control exerted in this case refers 
specifically to the flow of information from legislation to institutions by selecting 
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members to advisory committees that represent legislative interests. The case 
study examined here was a prominent advisory committee to the EPA, the 
National Drinking Water Advisory Council (NDWAC). They found that agency 
decisions were impacted by advisory committee membership and representation 
from interests. It is possible that these political influences work via similar 
mechanisms at the state level. Kentucky’s PDMP Advisory Council is appointed 
by the Kentucky Governor and other state PDMP advisory council’s or 
committee’s are appointed by each respective state’s Governor or by a 
member(s) of state legislature.70  
Policy-makers have been criticized for avoiding evidence-based decision 
making approaches similar to those that health care practitioners advocate when 
evaluating new policies,71 but these criticisms ignore the myriad constraints of 
political influences operating on policy-makers as well as the process by which 
problems demand attention through policy intervention. Balla points out that 
professional organizations have an important role to play in the diffusion of 
health-related policies72 and the deferral of state PDMP requirements to 
regulation by licensing boards rather than by statute speak to the importance of 
this role (e.g., compulsory use of Kentucky’s PDMP by prescribers in certain 
circumstances is regulated and enforced by professional licensing boards and is 
not explicitly mentioned in statute). These professional organizations, which are 
interest groups better poised to influence policy development with licensing 
boards for their respective professions68 than the state level PDMP, should not 
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be overlooked as likely having significant influence in the development of state 
PDMP regulations.  
Conclusion 
 
State PDMPs present a policy solution to the asymmetric information 
problem grappled with by prescribers and dispensers of controlled substances, 
but the blurring of realms between law enforcement and health care raises 
questions about the implications of further policy interventions in medical 
practice. The variation that arose in state PDMP policies may be attributed to a 
variety of factors, many of which are described in this piece, and can partially 
explain the observed differences in the impacts of these policies on several key 
program outcomes such as,  
1) Prescriber and dispenser behaviors;   
2) Law enforcement activities; 
3) Consumer behaviors and outcomes related to controlled substance 
consumption; and, 
4) Reimbursement policies of controlled substances by publicly funded 
health insurance programs (e.g., Medicaid, Medicare). 
Several of these outcomes will be examined empirically in the following chapters, 
the next of which utilizes state Medicaid prescription drug data to measure 
changes in quantities dispensed of selected controlled substances across states 
with and without PDMPs to Medicaid beneficiaries.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and Opioid Dispensing 
to Medicaid Beneficiaries 
 
Chapter Summary: This chapter examines the relationship of PDMP presence and program 
features with the marketplace for prescription drugs, particularly opioids, among state Medicaid 
beneficiaries. A hypothesized “substitution effect” following the implementation of state PDMPs is 
also explored in this chapter. Data for this chapter was acquired from the Medicaid Drug Rebate 
Program for the years 1991-2011. The research design consists of aggregating all opioids utilized 
by Medicaid patients to the state-year level, where the specific method employed was a time 
series, random effects generalized least squares (GLS) random effects regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is quantity of opioid substances, standardized to morphine milligram 
equivalents in order to account for variation in substance quantity, dosage, and strength. The 
independent variables include PDMP features as defined in Chapter 2 and year is also included 
as a covariate. Supplementary analyses of benzodiazepines are also conducted. 
 
Consumption of prescription medications for nonmedical use has 
increased substantially in the last two decades and prescription medications are 
now the second-most class of abused substance, after marijuana.1 Drug 
overdoses overtook traffic accidents in 2009 as the number one cause of 
accidental death for adults aged 25 to 64 in the United States and are the second 
leading cause of accidental death among people of all ages.73 The majority of 
these drug overdose deaths (75 percent in 2010) involve the class of pain-
relieving medications known as opioids.74 In addition to elevated mortality risks 
when compared to other drugs, opioids tend to have a high potential for abuse. 
Substance abuse treatment admissions for opioids have increased substantially 
in the last two decades: from less than 1 percent of total national treatment 
admissions in 1993 to approximately 9 percent total national treatment 
admissions in 2011 and approximately 32 percent of total treatment admissions 
in Kentucky.51   
The negative economic, social, and public health consequences 
associated with the abuse and diversion of prescription drugs, and opioids in 
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particular, have sparked the innovation and diffusion of policy solutions that 
mitigate the information asymmetry problem that health providers face when 
providing access to controlled substances to consumers. These policy solutions, 
in the form of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), track the 
prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances with the purpose of reducing 
abuse and diversion23 by allowing health providers to access information about 
the history of controlled substance use by individual consumers. As of 2015, 49 
states and the District of Columbia have enacted PDMP legislation. Currently, 43 
states have implemented this legislation and are administering operational 
programs.29  
Prescription medications and illicit substances that have the potential for 
abuse are classified as controlled substances by the Food and Drug 
Administration and the Drug Enforcement Administration.21 Controlled 
substances are classified according to the level of risk for abuse potential and 
these classifications are called “Schedules,” as defined in Chapter 1. This piece 
will isolate the impact of state PDMPs on the dispensing of two classes of 
controlled substances in particular, opioids and benzodiazepines. Opioids and 
benzodiazepines are two large families of drugs with several individual forms and 
dosages that are categorized as controlled substances. Opioids, which are pain-
relieving drugs derived naturally or synthetically from chemical components of 
opium, are of particular interest due to the high potential for abuse and overdose 
as well as the most likely class of drug to be sought in instances of “doctor 
shopping.”28 Opioids, when Scheduled, can be classified as Schedule II, 
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Schedule III, Schedule V, or in rare cases are Unscheduled (typically cough 
syrups). Benzodiazepines are a class of drugs that act as sedatives (anxiolytics) 
and formulations tend to be Scheduled lower than opioid drug formulations due 
to less overall abuse potential.75 All benzodiazepines are Schedule IV controlled 
substances. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is some evidence that PDMP 
implementation has caused the unintended consequence of a “substitution effect” 
where prescribers substitute the prescribing of Schedule II controlled substances 
with prescribing of lower Scheduled substances in order to decrease abuse 
potential or to decrease prescriber liability. However, these previous analyses 
rely on data from the Department of Justice’s Automation of Reports and 
Consolidated Order System (ARCOS), which does not have the ability to monitor 
interstate purchasing or to capture the intended indication for each dispensed 
drug.50 
 This study uses Medicaid Drug Rebate Program data as an alternative 
data source to track the total quantity dispensed of certain controlled substances. 
Medicaid drug rebate data compensates for the limitations of ARCOS data 
because Medicaid beneficiaries must reside in the state in which the 
reimbursement claim for the prescription drug is dispensed, which significantly 
reduces the potential for interstate purchasing. The characteristics of this data 
source will be discussed further in the Methods section.   
The purpose of this study is to test the following three hypotheses: 
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 Hypothesis 1: States with operational PDMPs will have total fewer 
opioids and benzodiazepines dispensed as compared to states with no 
operational PDMP.  
 Hypothesis 2: Proactive prescriber reporting, proactive law 
enforcement reporting, unfettered law enforcement access, 
compulsory prescriber registration, compulsory prescriber use, and 
monitoring of lower Scheduled substances are program characteristics 
that are associated with decreased total opioid and benzodiazepine 
units dispensed. 
 Hypothesis 3: A “substitution effect” between higher Scheduled 
substances and lowered Scheduled substances occurs in states with a 
PDMP. 
Methods 
 
 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA) called for drug 
manufacturers to agree to the creation of prescription drug rebates in exchange 
for federal matching funds for state Medicaid prescription drug spending.76 
Beginning in 1990, agreements are annually negotiated for each covered drug.  
The reimbursement rate is typically calculated as a percentage discount from the 
drug’s average retail price or as the difference between the drug’s average retail 
price and the lowest wholesale price offered in a transaction in the previous year.  
 Medicaid Drug Rebate Program data is publicly available from the time 
since the program’s inception to two years before the present and includes the 
following data for each state: each drug covered in every state, the total number 
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of prescriptions dispensed, the total quantity of units of each drug dispensed 
(e.g., number of pills, number of liquid doses, etc.), the total dollar amount of 
Medicaid reimbursement for each drug dispensed, and the total dollar amount of 
reimbursement for drugs that were not eligible for Medicaid matching funds.77 
(Note: data is not available for Arizona before 2010 due to nonparticipation.) This 
rebate data has been validated in the literature and is typically used to perform 
state-level trend analysis of prescription drug utilization and expenditures in 
Medicaid.78-82 
 Data files from all 50 states and the District of Columbia were web-
scraped and merged into a single database after being tagged with state, year, 
and quarter identifiers for the years 1991 through 2011. Drugs were uniquely 
identified in the data using the National Drug Code (NDC), which assigns each 
drug an 11-digit number that is coded to identify the manufacturer, product, 
strength, package size, and distributer of the drug.83 The total quantity of units of 
each drug dispensed by state was selected as the primary outcome of interest 
rather than the total number of prescriptions dispensed so that changes in the 
actual quantity of each drug supplied to states could be measured. Number of 
prescriptions varies by the days supply provided in the prescription (e.g., 7 days, 
30 days, 60 days, etc.). Without knowing the days supply, it is difficult to 
accurately count the units of the drug dispensed.
  Two classes of drugs, opioids and benzodiazepines, were isolated for this 
analysis due to the availability of conversion factors for these classes of drugs. 
Also, benzodiazepines are often implicated in adverse events when prescribed or 
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used in conjunction with opioids.84 The conversion factor for opioids, known as 
morphine milligram equivalents, allows for the comparison of the units of each 
opioid to occur in a standardized fashion.9 Morphine milligram equivalents 
(MMEs) were derived from a peer-reviewed conversion of each specific opioid 
based on factors such as the route of administration, dosage form, quantity, and 
strength of drug.85,86 A total of 12,050 unique opioid formulations were converted 
to MMEs based upon these procedures and Table 3.1 contains a sample of 
these MME conversions for selected prescription opioids. 
Table 3.1 Conversion Factors for Selected Opioids to Standardized MMEs 
Generic Medication 
Name 
National Drug 
Code (NDC) 
Dosage Form Strength Unit of 
Dosage 
Measurement 
MME 
Conversion 
Factor 
Buprenorphine 35356060504 Patch, extended 
release 
10 MCG/HR 42 
Hydromorphone 
Hydrochloride 
23635040801 
 
Tablet, extended 
release 
8 MG 4 
Methadone 
Hydrochloride 
00054454725 
 
Tablet 40 MG 3 
Morphine Sulfate 00034051310 Tablet, extended 
release 
200 MG 1 
Oxycodone 
Hydrochloride 
00093002401 
 
Tablet, extended 
release 
10 MG 1.5 
Acetaminophen/Cod
eine Phosphate 
00005313123 
 
Tablet 16 MG 0.15 
Hydrocodone 
Bitartrate/Ibuprofen 
68115035260 
 
Tablet 7.5 MG 1 
The conversion factors for standardizing benzodiazepines are not as 
universally agreed upon. For this analysis, the peer-reviewed conversion factors 
reported by Shader et al. (1994) that converts all benzodiazepines into a 
standardized diazepam milligram equivalent (DME) were selected, but there are 
some disagreements in the literature about the appropriate scale of conversion 
factors for some benzodiazepine drugs and the difference in conversion 
magnitude for parenteral versus oral dosage forms.87,88 Table 3.2 contains a 
 49 
sample of these diazepam-equivalent conversions for selected prescription 
benzodiazepines. 
Table 3.2 Conversion Factors for Selected Benzodiazepines to Standardized 
Diazepam Milligram Equivalents 
             Generic 
 Medication Name 
National Drug 
Code (NDC) 
Dosage Form Strength Unit of 
Dosage 
Measurement 
Diazepam 
Conversion 
Factor 
Clorazepate 
Dipotassium 
 
00003086250 
 
Capsule 3.75 MG 15 
Chlordiazepoxide 
Hydrochloride 
 
00074264853 
 
 
Capsule 5 MG 50 
Temazepam 
 
00078009913 
 
Capsule 30 MG 30 
Estazolam 
 
00093013001 
 
Tablet 2 MG 2 
Clonazepam 
 
00185006310 
 
Tablet 0.5 MG 0.5 
Triazolam 
 
00364259833 
 
Tablet 0.125 MG 0.25 
 
The unit of analysis for this retrospective study was NDC-State-Year level 
observations. The standardized quantities of dispensed opioid and 
benzodiazepines were set as the dependent variables (four specifications: 
Schedule II opioids, Schedule III opioids, Schedule IV benzodiazepines, and 
Unscheduled opioids) and data on the characteristics of state PDMPs, defined 
and operationalized in Chapter 2, were the explanatory variables of interest. 
State PDMP characteristics of interest were coded as dummy variables where “1” 
represented the presence of the PDMP characteristic within the state during the 
time period of the observation and “0” represented the absence of the PDMP 
characteristic within the state during the time period of the observation. Summary 
frequencies of each PDMP characteristic of interest as well as frequency of NDC 
observations per state-year within the dataset can be found in Table 3.3.  
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All statistical analysis was performed in Stata v13. A correlation matrix that 
tested the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variables was constructed before regression analysis to test for unexpected 
relationships between the explanatory variables. There were several strong 
correlations between certain PDMP characteristics as expected; for instance, all 
states with operational PDMPs monitor Schedule II controlled substances so this 
variable is not included in the analysis.  
The longitudinal nature of the observations called for setting up the 
analysis as panel data. Fixed and random effects models were run and a 
Hausman test was performed to compare within and between estimators. The 
Hausman test indicated that the random effects model was a more appropriate 
fit, but it should be noted that the “within” effects estimators were small (within 
estimators <0.001 in all specifications) due to the limited variation in PDMP 
characteristics over time. Coefficients were estimated via Greater Least Squares 
(GLS) regression and Stata’s “robust” option was utilized to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. The summary of the regression results can be seen in Table 
3.5.  
There was significant variation in the number of controlled substance 
Schedules monitored by state PDMPs.  Controls for Schedule monitoring were 
used but there were too few observations to conduct the Schedule V opioid 
specification, due to the rarity of Schedule V opioids.  
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Results 
 
Table 3.3 below provides a summary of the PDMP characteristic 
frequencies observed in the data. All states with a PDMP monitor Schedule II 
controlled substances and most monitored Schedules III and IV controlled 
substances by 2011, the end of the study period. Few states require registration 
and compulsory prescriber use was relatively rare during the study period.  
Table 3.3 State PDMP Characteristics (Total NDC-State-Years=180,578) 
PDMP Variable States with 
Characteristic  
(in 2011) 
Total NDC-State-Year  
Observations 
Operational PDMP 43 45,891 
Proactive PDMP: Prescribers 38 35,065 
Proactive PDMP: Law Enforcement 25 50,429 
Law Enforcement Access 13 25,978 
Compulsory Registration 14 12,892 
Compulsory Prescriber Use 5 1,532 
Interstate Data Sharing 22 12,097 
Data Transmission <1 Week 7 2,314 
Schedule III Monitored 37 42,042 
Schedule IV Monitored 36 41,870 
Schedule V Monitored 22 30,505 
Unscheduled Substances Monitored 37 13,780 
 
 Table 3.4 illustrates the Schedule classification of the prescription opioids 
and benzodiazepines in the data and how they are distributed. There were very 
few observations of Schedule V drugs and Unscheduled substances. 
Table 3.4 NDC-State-Year Observations of Opioids and Benzodiazepines, by 
Schedule  
Schedule Frequency (% of Total) 
Schedule II 266,411 (23.91%) 
Schedule III 226,481 (20.33%) 
Schedule IV  596,274 (53.52%) 
Schedule V 18 (<0.01%) 
Unscheduled Substances 24,904 (2.24%) 
   
Figure 3.1 shows the log of opioid and benzodiazepine prescriptions 
dispensed over time by Schedule, as measured in standardized units of MMEs 
(opioids) and DMEs (benzodiazepines). Only Unscheduled prescription 
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medications experienced a downward trend in dispensing over time. Schedule V 
was excluded due to there being too few Schedule V opioids. 
Figure 3.1 Opioid (Schedule II, II, Unscheduled) and Benzodiazepine (Schedule 
4) Controlled Substance Dispensing, 1999-2011 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.2 below shows the (log) dollar amount of Medicaid 
reimbursement for all opioids and benzodiazepine prescription medications over 
time for each Schedule of controlled substances. Total Medicaid reimbursement 
increased for each Schedule, but at a lower rate for Schedule IV substances. 
Schedule V substances were excluded due to a lack of observations. 
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Figure 3.2 Medicaid Reimbursement for Opioids and Benzodiazepines, by 
Schedule for 1999-2011 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 includes the results of the regression analysis for Schedule II 
and Schedule III opioid MMEs, and Table 3.6 includes regression results for 
Unscheduled opioid MMEs and Schedule IV benzodiazepine DMEs. The 
presence of an operational PDMP was associated with 26 percent decrease in 
Schedule II opioid MMEs dispensed (p<0.05) and a 24 percent increase in 
Schedule IV benzodiazepine DMEs (p<0.05) dispensed to Medicaid 
beneficiaries, but had no significant impact in dispensed opioid MMEs from lower 
Schedules.  
Schedule III opioid MME dispensing increased in states that had 
compulsory registration and prescriber use of the PDMP by 28 percent and 27 
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percent, respectively (p<0.05). While interstate data sharing was associated with 
an 18 percent decrease in Schedule II opioid MME dispensing, there was no 
statistically significant impact on Schedule III opioid MME dispensing. 
Conversely, frequent pharmacy data transmission was associated with 
decreased Schedule III opioid MME dispensing (29 percent, p<0.05), but not with 
Schedule II opioid MME dispensing.  
Proactive reports to prescribers were associated with increases in MMEs 
and DMEs dispensed in every Schedule, with the exception of Schedule III. Open 
law enforcement access to PDMP data was associated with decreases in 
Unscheduled MME and Schedule IV DME dispensing, but had no significant 
relationship with MME dispensing of higher Scheduled opioids. Frequent data 
transmission was associated with a 36 percent decrease in Unscheduled opioid 
MME dispensing and a 34 percent decrease in benzodiazepine DME dispensing 
(p<0.05) as well. 
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Table 3.5 The Impact of PDMP State Characteristics on (logged) Total Units of 
Schedule II and Schedule III Opioid MMEs Dispensed 
 Schedule II Opioid 
MMEs 
Schedule III Opioid 
MMEs 
Independent Variables Coefficient Robust SE
†
 Coefficient Robust SE 
PDMP Variables     
  Operational PDMP -0.26* 0.09 -0.06 0.08 
  Proactive PDMP: Prescribers  0.12* 0.05 0.12 0.07 
  Proactive PDMP: Law Enforcement  0.08* 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
  Law Enforcement Access -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
  Compulsory Registration 0.08 0.05 0.28* 0.06 
  Compulsory Prescriber Use -0.08 0.10 0.27* 0.13 
  Interstate Data Sharing -0.18* 0.04 -0.01 0.06 
  Data Transmission <1 Week -0.08 0.07 -0.29* 0.10 
  Monitors Schedule III -0.57* 0.24 -1.06* 0.31 
  Monitors Schedule IV 0.85* 0.23 1.12* 0.31 
  Monitors Schedule V -0.04 0.05 -0.13* 0.06 
  Monitors Unscheduled Substances -0.18* 0.05 0.11 0.06 
Year Covariates (1991 is reference)     
   1992 0.04 0.06 0.55* 0.06 
   1993 0.06 0.06 0.31* 0.06 
   1994 0.12* 0.06 0.52* 0.06 
   1995 0.07 0.06 0.81* 0.06 
   1996 0.02 0.06 0.88* 0.06 
   1997 0.11 0.06 0.83* 0.06 
   1998 -0.03 0.06 0.91* 0.06 
   1999 0.12* 0.06 0.95* 0.06 
   2000 -0.06 0.06 0.77* 0.06 
   2001 -0.01 0.06 0.90* 0.06 
   2002 -0.13* 0.06 0.66* 0.06 
   2003 0.02 0.06 0.63* 0.06 
   2004 0.03 0.06 0.69* 0.06 
   2005 0.11 0.06 0.51* 0.06 
   2006 0.01 0.06 0.43* 0.06 
   2007 -0.01 0.06 0.52* 0.06 
   2008 0.06 0.06 0.68* 0.07 
   2009 0.15* 0.06 0.79* 0.07 
   2010 0.09 0.06 0.99* 0.07 
   2011 0.03 0.06 1.13* 0.08 
†
Abbreviation for Standard Error 
*Indicates statistical significance: p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 
Table 3.6 The Impact of PDMP State Characteristics on (logged) Total Units of 
Unscheduled Opioid MMEs and Schedule IV Benzodiazepine DMEs Dispensed 
 Unscheduled Opioid 
MMEs 
Schedule IV Benzodiazepine 
DMEs 
Independent Variables Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE 
PDMP Variables     
  Operational PDMP -0.12 0.25 0.24* 0.07 
  Proactive PDMP: Prescribers 0.47* 0.13 0.40* 0.06 
  Proactive PDMP: Law Enforcement -0.10 0.09 -0.05 0.03 
  Law Enforcement Access -0.21* 0.10 -0.06* 0.03 
  Compulsory Registration -0.00 0.11 0.11* 0.05 
  Compulsory Prescriber Use 0.05 0.24 -0.24* 0.13 
  Interstate Data Sharing -0.01 0.10 -0.03 0.05 
  Data Transmission <1 Week -0.36* 0.16 -0.34* 0.09 
  Monitors Schedule III -0.74 0.58 -1.21* 0.39 
  Monitors Schedule IV 0.83 0.54 0.99* 0.39 
  Monitors Schedule V 0.15 0.11 -0.17* 0.05 
  Monitors Unscheduled Substances 0.04 0.12 0.22* 0.05 
Year Covariates (1991 is reference)     
   1992 0.10 0.29 0.01 0.03 
   1993 -0.54 0.35 0.05 0.05 
   1994 -0.30 0.34 -0.17* 0.04 
   1995 0.21 0.35 -0.33* 0.04 
   1996 0.24 0.29 -0.28* 0.04 
   1997 0.65* 0.32 -0.37* 0.04 
   1998 0.45 0.31 -0.36* 0.04 
   1999 0.44 0.31 -0.29* 0.04 
   2000 -0.29 0.32 -0.71* 0.04 
   2001 1.54* 0.33 -0.79* 0.04 
   2002 0.60* 0.27 -0.93* 0.04 
   2003 -0.43 0.28 -0.91* 0.04 
   2004 -0.60* 0.28 -0.85* 0.05 
   2005 -0.82* 0.27 -1.16* 0.05 
   2006 -0.98* 0.26 -1.27* 0.05 
   2007 -0.85* 0.27 -1.52* 0.05 
   2008 -1.19* 0.27 -1.38* 0.05 
   2009 -1.60* 0.26 -1.59* 0.05 
   2010 -1.53* 0.26 -1.28* 0.06 
   2011 -1.37* 0.27 -1.29* 0.06 
*Indicates statistical significance: p<0.05 
 
Discussion 
 
States dispense an increasing number of opioids and benzodiazepines 
each year to Medicaid beneficiaries, but states with operational PDMPs tend to 
dispense fewer total units of Schedule II opioids and Schedule IV 
benzodiazepines to Medicaid beneficiaries when compared to states without 
operational PDMPs. This suggests a possible substitution effect or shift from 
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Schedule II opioids to alternative pain-relief treatments; though, an increase in 
Schedule III opioids was not observed in states with operational PDMPs. PDMP 
features also appear to have differential impacts on the Schedule of controlled 
substance being examined; for example, states that share PDMP data with other 
states had lower Schedule II opioid dispensations, but not lower Schedule III 
opioid dispensations. 
Interestingly, states with compulsory PDMP registration appear to 
dispense more units of Scheduled II opioids and Schedule IV benzodiazepines 
than states without compulsory PDMP registration. This seems to contradict the 
notion that PDMPs decrease controlled substance prescribing/dispensing; 
however, it is possible that prescribers who are required to use the PDMP are 
more confident in their prescribing decisions when compared to prescribers that 
only use the PDMP in circumstances where they already suspect a patient’s 
problematic controlled substance history. Compulsory use of the PDMP suggests 
that the prescriber must incorporate PDMP data into the assessment and 
treatment of the patient’s conditions; whereas, the availability of PDMP data in a 
state where the prescriber may use the PDMP only at their discretion suggests 
that the PDMP serves as one of many tools by which assessment and treatment 
decisions are justified.  
The Schedules monitored by state PDMPs also have an influence on the 
amount of opioids and benzodiazepines dispensed within states. Most notably, 
there was reduced dispensing of both Schedule II and Schedule III opioids in 
states that enacted Schedule III opioid monitoring by the PDMP; however, the 
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magnitude of the reduction in Schedule III opioids was much larger. What 
remains unclear, however, is if decreases in the amount of opioids and 
benzodiazepines dispensed is the “desirable” outcome of PDMPs.41  
This research design has several limitations. First, the analysis was limited 
to two classes of prescription medications, though opioids and benzodiazepines 
do make up a significant portion of controlled substance dispensing in the United 
States. Further study with this data should include an expanded selection of 
drugs, both Scheduled and Unscheduled. A second limitation of this design is the 
possibility that PDMPs cause a shift in dispensing of Scheduled substances that 
is unobserved due to the use of conversion factors. For example, lower 
Scheduled substances tend to be converted to smaller unit sizes than higher 
Scheduled substances. This could lead to an underrepresentation of lower 
Scheduled substances, or overrepresentation of higher Scheduled substances, in 
the standardized count of units dispensed. Repeating the analysis without the 
use of conversions to standardized units and comparing the results to the current 
analysis could test this possibility.  
Finally, total quantities of opioids and benzodiazepines dispensed to 
Medicaid beneficiaries may not be representative of trends of opioid and 
benzodiazepine dispensing to the population as a whole. There is some evidence 
to suggest that Medicaid patients tend to use more opioid controlled substances 
and for longer periods of time than patients with private pay or commercial 
insurance and this increased usage has been documented for non-cancer pain 
conditions89 as well as all pain conditions.90 
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 Several characteristics of state PDMPs are associated with changes in the 
total amount of opioids and benzodiazepines dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries 
in a state, but it is unclear whether changes in the dispensing of these 
substances has a clinical impact on treatment accessibility for legitimate medical 
need or an impact on the reduction of abuse and diversion. The evidence 
presented above supports hypothesis 1 (states with PDMPs have decreased 
dispensing of opioids and benzodiazepines) and partially supports hypothesis 2 
(some PDMP characteristics are associated with decreased dispensing of 
opioids and benzodiazepines).  
The evidence does not definitely support the hypothesis that a 
“substitution effect” between higher Scheduled substances and lower Scheduled 
substances is occurring between opioids, and the possibility of unobserved 
factors not accounted for in this analysis should encourage caution with the 
conclusions that have been drawn. Future versions of this study should attempt 
to include measurements of prescriber, pharmacist, and law enforcement 
participation in the PDMP rather than the indicator variables for compulsory 
registration and compulsory prescriber use of the PDMP. Information about the 
frequency of use and the change in prescriber or dispenser behavior resulting 
from PDMP use would provide a more complete measurement tool of PDMP 
impact on dispensing.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Trends in Opioid Prescribing Associated with Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs: 
Claims from a Commercially Insured Population 
 
Chapter Summary: A retrospective analysis of commercial insurance prescription claims data is 
undertaken to examine the impact of PDMPs on the healthcare system by analyzing patterns in 
opioid prescription claims. Utilization estimates of selected opioids dispensed over time are 
calculated to characterize prescribing trends, then the relationship between opioid prescribing 
and the PDMP features and regulations operationalized in Chapter 2 is quantified. The 2007-
2009 time period for this analysis allows for a “natural” policy experiment, due to the heavy 
uptake in state PDMP implementation within this time frame. 
 
This empirical chapter continues with the exploration of state prescription 
drug monitoring program (PDMPs) effects on the marketplace for prescription 
drugs and touches upon effects on the healthcare system resulting from PDMPs 
by analyzing patterns in opioid prescription claims from a commercially insured 
United States patient population. At this time, commercial insurance prescription 
claims have rarely been used as a data source in published evaluations of 
PDMPs or in conceptualizing opioid consumption with regards to PDMP 
implementation. A pharmacy benefit manager database for commercial claims 
was used to calculate state-level opioid prescription prevalence estimates for the 
year 2000, and this estimate did include an analysis of the relationship between 
PDMP presence and opioid prescription rate (finding decreased opioid utilization 
in states that monitored Schedule II controlled substances), but did not control for 
other PDMP characteristics or pharmaceutical opioid control policies.41   
In contrast with Medicaid populations, commercially insured populations 
tend to be older, wealthier, and report different frequencies of diseases and 
injuries associated with chronic pain.91 This suggests that PDMPs may have a 
differential impact on commercially insured patient prescription opioid 
 61 
consumption as compared to the trends observed from Medicaid in the previous 
chapter. The purpose of this study is to quantify overall opioid consumption and 
consumption by opioid type in this population, then explore a possible 
relationship between PDMP presence and features of the quantity and type of 
opioids prescribed and consumed.   
Methods 
 
The research design for this chapter is a retrospective analysis of 
commercial insurance claims data, with calculated utilization estimates of 
selected opioids (hydrocodone, oxycodone, buprenorphine, methadone, and 
hydromorphone) dispensed over time to examine prescribing trends as 
correlated with the PDMP features and regulations operationalized in the prior 
two chapters. The highlighted opioids (hydrocodone, oxycodone, buprenorphine, 
methadone, hydromorphone) are isolated as dependent variables to determine if 
there are differential impacts of PDMPs on the dispensation of these substances 
to commercial insurance beneficiaries. These opioids were chosen based on the 
review of the literature, where evidence suggests that these opioids are the most 
susceptible to abuse and diversion.92-94 
The 2007-2009 time period for this analysis allows for a “natural” policy 
experiment, due to the heavy uptake in state PDMP implementation within this 
time frame (i.e., 23 states had established PDMPs for the whole research period, 
17 states and the District of Columbia had no PDMP during the research period, 
and 10 states implemented their PDMP at some point during this period).  
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The patient population is defined as those who were continuously enrolled 
in the commercial insurer’s health plans from January 1, 2007 through December 
31, 2009. The commercial insurance claims database, the i3 InVision Data Mart, 
contains de-identified medical and prescription claims records from a 
representative sample of every state totaling 22 million covered lives. This 
database does contain a small number of records for Medicaid Managed Care 
patients but these patients were excluded from analysis. Figure 4.1 outlines 
exclusion and inclusion procedure. Patients were included if they were over 18 
years of age and under 64 years of age to avoid un-captured prescriptions due to 
potential overlapping coverage from the Children’s Health Insurance Program if 
under 18 or Medicare if older than 64. Patients were required to have at least one 
prescription opioid for inclusion in the study population. 
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Figure 4.1 Patient Population Inclusion and Exclusion Procedure 
                               
Opioid prescriptions were identified in claims using national drug code 
identification numbers as outlined in the previous chapter. For clarity, opioid 
prescriptions were summed as whole prescriptions per patient rather than 
quantity of dosages to patient per prescription. The database contained pre-
coded flags for opioid prescriptions, and individual opioid prescription types (e.g., 
products containing hydrocodone, products containing oxycodone, products 
containing hydromorphone) were flagged using regular expressions of partial or 
full text matches within the field for active ingredient drug name. Descriptive 
statistics were calculated for prescription frequencies as well as patient and 
patient state of residence characteristics. Next, a count regression model was 
employed to examine predictors of the count of opioid prescriptions per patient, 
the dependent variable, on patient-level and state-level independent variables. 
Patient-level predictors and covariates include age, gender, and race, and state-
Total Commercial 
Insurance Patients 
(n=21,891,711) 
Continuously 
Enrolled  
Aged 18 to 64 
Had at Least One 
Opioid Prescription 
Final Patient 
Population 
(n=1,296,614) 
Medicaid Managed 
Care Excluded 
(n=1,157,898) 
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level predictors include PDMP presence in the state of patient residence and 
PDMP program features.  
Clustering was conducted by state and estimated coefficients were 
converted to incidence rate ratios. The first specification included all opioid 
prescriptions, while additional specifications were isolated to selected opioid 
types. Negative binomial distributions were fitted to each specification of the 
dependent variable, which was appropriate due to over-dispersed counts of 
opioid prescriptions per patient. All analysis was conducted in Stata v13.95 
Results 
 Total opioid prescriptions increased during the study period, with 
oxycodone and hydrocodone products representing the most substantial 
increases in opioid prescriptions from 2007 to 2009 (Table 4.1). Prescriptions for 
“other” opioids decreased during the study period. Overall, 6,310,730 opioid 
prescriptions were dispensed to the commercially insured patients in this 
population during the study period.  
Table 4.1 Commercial Insurance Patient Utilization of Opioid Prescriptions by 
Year and Type, All States and District of Columbia 
Opioid Type Year 2007 
n (%) 
Year 2008 
n (%) 
Year 2009 
n (%) 
Hydrocodone 942,639 (49.85%) 1,066,857 (49.54%) 1,118,978 (49.37%) 
Oxycodone 354,747 (18.76%) 415,018  (19.27%) 463,809 (20.46%) 
Buprenorphine 11,535 (0.61%) 16,905 (0.79%) 23,022 (1.02%) 
Methadone 19,250 (1.02%) 21,729 (1.01%) 23,167 (1.02%) 
Hydromorphone 13,168 (0.70%) 16,918 (0.80%) 21,161 (0.93%) 
Other Opioids 549,668 (29.07%) 515,871 (23.96%) 516,288 (22.78%) 
Total Opioid Prescriptions
*
 1,891,007 2,153,298 2,266,425 
*
An individual patient may have multiple prescriptions in the dataset. 
  There were 1,296,614 unique patients represented in the data and a 
patient could potentially have multiple opioid prescriptions. More females (56.53 
percent) than males (43.47 percent) received an opioid prescription at least once 
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during the study period (Table 4.2). The majority of patients who received at least 
one opioid prescription identified as white race (75.84 percent) and 8.01 percent 
identified as Hispanic. More than half of patients had either some college 
education or a college degree and mean age was 44 years. Hydrocodone 
prescriptions (mean 12.34 prescriptions) were the most common type of opioid 
prescriptions in the patient population, but it should be noted that the distribution 
of opioid prescriptions in each opioid type was skewed such that mean was 
greater than the median.  
 Patients resided in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. In 2007, 
40.33 percent of patients were residing in states that had an operational PDMP 
and by 2009 that proportion increased to 55.47 percent due to the uptake in state 
PDMP implementation. Proactive prescriber reporting by state PDMPs also 
experienced a substantial increase in implementation, with 28.66 percent of 
patients residing in proactive states in 2007 and 41.49 percent by 2009. Few 
states engaged in compulsory prescriber PDMP use or pharmacy prescription 
record data transmissions of less than one week during the study period. There 
was no variation in state PDMP monitoring of Schedule III and Schedule IV 
substances during this period.  
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Table 4.2 Commercial Insurance Patient Population and State of Residence 
Characteristics by Year, All States and District of Columbia 
Characteristics Year 2007 Year 2008    Year 2009 All Years 
Patient n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Gender     
   Female 359,965 (58.03%) 221,907 (55.95%) 151,168 (54.04%) 733,040 (56.53%) 
   Male  260,320 (41.97%) 174,698 (44.05%) 128,556 (45.96%) 563,574 (43.47%) 
Race     
   White 475,795 (76.71%) 298,645 (75.30%) 208,856 (74.67%) 983,296 (75.84%) 
   Black 31,579 (5.09%) 23,844 (6.01%) 16,011 (5.72%) 71,434 (5.51%) 
   Other and Multiple Races 60,744 (9.79%) 39,868 (10.05%) 29,701 (10.62%) 130,313 (10.05%) 
   Missing Race Data 52,167 (8.41%) 34,248 (8.64%) 25,156 (8.99%) 111,571 (8.6%) 
Hispanic Ethnicity 48,505 (7.82%) 31,836 (8.03%) 23,501 (8.40%) 103,842 (8.01%) 
Education Level     
   Less than High School 9,857 (1.59%) 6,633 (1.67%) 4,722 (1.69%) 21,212 (1.64%) 
   High School 213,206 (34.37%) 137,902 (34.77%) 93,438 (33.40%) 444,546 (34.29%) 
   Some College 284,750 (45.91%) 177,282 (44.70%) 126,691 (45.29%) 588,723 (45.40%) 
   College and Beyond 95,108 (15.33%) 63,481 (16.01%) 47,086 (16.83%) 205,675 (15.86%) 
   Missing Education Data 17,364 (2.8%) 11,307 (2.85%) 7,787 (2.79%) 36,458 (2.81%) 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Age in Years 43.77 (11.18) 44.48 (11.37) 45.34 (11.36) 44.32 (11.29) 
Hydrocodone Prescriptions 12.23 (19.27) 12.57 (19.22) 12.21 (18.53) 12.34 (18.99) 
Oxycodone Prescriptions 7.40 (18.38) 7.34 (17.99) 7.08 (17.42) 7.27 (17.91) 
Buprenorphine Prescriptions 0.40 (3.65) 0.37 (3.52) 0.34 (3.37) 0.37 (3.51) 
Methadone Prescriptions 0.66 (4.49) 0.62 (4.38) 0.58 (4.23) 0.62 (4.36) 
Hydromorphone Prescriptions 0.41 (3.22) 0.40 (3.16) 0.38 (2.96) 0.39 (3.11) 
Other Opioid Prescriptions 9.50 (19.56) 9.42 (18.98) 8.82 (18.05) 9.23 (18.83) 
All Opioid Prescriptions  30.60 (36.05) 30.73 (35.14) 29.41 (33.82) 30.22 (34.96) 
Patient State of Residence
*
  n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
    PDMP Operational 268,761 (43.33%) 188,817 (47.61%) 155,165 (55.47%) 612,743 (47.26%) 
    Proactive Prescribers 177,778 (28.66%) 136,584 (34.44%) 116,057 (41.49%) 430,419 (33.20%) 
    Proactive Law Enforcement 254,319 (41.00%) 175,055 (44.14%) 126,095 (45.08%) 555,469 (42.84%) 
    Law Enforcement Access 152,762 (24.63%) 98,837 (24.92%) 71,486 (25.56%) 323,085 (24.92%) 
    Compulsory Registration 83,820 (13.51%) 75,045 (18.92%) 65,834 (23.54%) 224,699 (17.33%) 
    Compulsory Prescriber Use 23,477 (3.78%) 13,601 (3.43%) 9,438 (3.37%) 46,516 (3.59%) 
    Interstate Data Sharing 111,994 (18.06%) 82,378 (20.77%) 72,114 (25.78%) 266,486 (20.55%) 
    Data Transmission <1 Week 0 (0.00%) 12,419 (3.13%) 10,503 (3.75%) 22,922 (1.77%) 
    Schedule III Monitored 262,998 (42.40%) 185,097 (46.67%) 152,311 (54.45%) 600,406 (46.31%) 
    Schedule IV Monitored
†
 262,998 (42.40%) 185,097 (46.67%) 152,311 (54.45%) 600,406 (46.31%) 
    Schedule V Monitored 241,446 (38.93%) 157,475 (39.71%) 118,174 (67.27%) 517,095 (39.88%) 
    Unscheduled Substances 
Monitored 
71,329 (11.50%) 45,344 (11.43%) 38,422 (13.74%) 155,095 (11.96%) 
Total Unique Patients
‡
 620,285  396,605 279,724 1,296,614 
*
Indicates the number of unique patients residing in states with the highlighted program 
characteristics. 
†
Omitted in multivariate modeling due to lack of state-level variation between Schedule III and 
Schedule IV monitoring during the study period. 
‡
Unique patients represent the number of unduplicated individual patients identified in the dataset 
(i.e., an individual may appear in the dataset multiple times if they have more than one 
prescription, but here they are only counted on their first appearance). 
 
 Table 4.3 contains regression results for each model specification. 
Females were less likely than males to receive prescriptions for oxycodone (IRR: 
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0.87; 95% CI: 0.80-0.95), methadone (IRR: 0.82; 95% CI: 0.71-0.95), and 
buprenorphine (IRR: 0.50; 95% CI: 0.41-0.61); however, females were more 
likely than males to receive hydrocodone (IRR: 1.09; 95% CI: 1.04-1.14), and 
prescriptions for all other types of opioids (IRR: 1.41; 95% CI: 1.33-1.49).  
Patients who identified as black race were less likely to receive prescriptions for 
any type of opioid when compared to their white race counterparts and patients 
who are Hispanic were less likely to receive prescriptions for any type of opioid 
when compared to patients who are not Hispanic. 
 Lower educational attainment (high school degree or some college) was 
associated with a greater number of hydrocodone prescriptions when compared 
to patients with a college degree. Interestingly, lower educational attainment was 
associated with significantly fewer buprenorphine prescriptions when compared 
to patients with a college degree. Older age was associated with a greater 
number of opioid prescriptions for every type of opioid with the exception of 
buprenorphine, where younger age was associated with a higher number of 
buprenorphine prescriptions. 
The presence of an operational PDMP was associated with fewer 
prescriptions for hydrocodone (IRR: 0.73; 95% CI: 0.62-0.86) and methadone 
(IRR: 0.65; 95% CI: 0.53-0.80), but greater prescriptions for oxycodone (IRR: 
1.58; 95% CI: 1.20-2.09). Proactive reporting of patient prescription records to 
prescribers was associated with greater prescriptions for buprenorphine (IRR: 
1.61; 95% CI: 1.16-2.25) and hydromorphone (IRR: 1.85; 95% CI: 1.34-2.55). 
Proactive reporting of prescription records to law enforcement officials was also 
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associated with greater buprenorphine prescriptions (IRR: 1.39; 95% CI: 1.14-
1.69). 
States that permitted law enforcement access to PDMP records without 
requiring a warrant, court order, or subpoena had an interesting relationship with 
opioid prescribing; hydrocodone prescriptions, which were Scheduled III during 
the study period, were higher in these states (IRR: 1.27; 95% CI: 1.06-1.52) while 
prescriptions for the Schedule II oxycodone products were lower in these states 
(IRR: 0.62; 95% CI: 0.46-0.85). 
Compulsory prescriber registration was associated with a greater number 
of prescriptions for oxycodone (IRR: 1.83; 95% CI: 1.20-2.78), methadone (IRR: 
1.34; 95% CI: 1.09-1.64), and hydromorphone (IRR: 1.58; 95% CI: 1.04-2.38), as 
was compulsory prescriber use of the PDMP; oxycodone (IRR: 2.08 (1.17-3.70), 
methadone (IRR: 1.82; 95% CI: 1.21-2.73), and hydromorphone (IRR: 2.16; 95% 
CI: 1.42-3.27). Participation in interstate data sharing between state PMDPs was 
also associated with greater oxycodone prescriptions (IRR: 1.22; 95% CI: 1.03-
1.46), but was not significantly associated with other types of opioid 
prescriptions. 
Frequent (<1 week) pharmacy data transmission to the PDMP was 
associated with fewer opioid prescriptions overall (IRR: 0.85; 95% CI: 0.75-0.95), 
and specifically with oxycodone (IRR: 0.63; 95% CI: 0.45-0.89), methadone (IRR: 
0.73; 95% CI: 0.58-0.93), and hydromorphone (IRR: 0.54; 95% CI: 0.32-0.89).  
All prescription opioids were classified as Schedule II, III, or V during the 
study period. The monitoring of lower (III and V) Scheduled substances had 
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varying relationships with the number of opioid prescriptions in the population, 
while the monitoring of non-controlled substances, also known as un-Scheduled 
substances, were not associated with changes in the number of opioid 
prescriptions in this commercially insured population. 
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Table 4.3 Negative Binomial Regression Results (n=6,310,730 prescriptions) 
 All Opioid 
Prescriptions 
Hydrocodone 
Prescriptions 
Oxycodone 
Prescriptions 
Buprenorphine 
Prescriptions 
Methadone 
Prescriptions 
Hydromorphone 
Prescriptions 
 IRR† (95% CI‡) IRR (95% CI) IRR (95% CI) IRR (95% CI) IRR (95% CI) IRR (95% CI) 
Female 1.09 (1.04-1.13)* 1.09 (1.04-1.14)* 0.87 (0.80-0.95)* 0.50 (0.41-0.61)* 0.82 (0.71-0.95)* 1.04 (0.91-1.19) 
Race (Reference White)       
   Black 0.73 (0.69-0.78)* 0.76 (0.70-0.81)* 0.73 (0.62-0.86)* 0.71 (0.53-0.96)* 0.62 (0.48-0.82)* 0.68 (0.50-0.93)* 
   Other and Multiple Races 0.90 (0.85-0.94)* 0.88 (0.82-0.95)* 0.87 (0.81-0.94)* 1.22 (0.93-1.60) 0.85 (0.71-1.01) 0.90 (0.69-1.17) 
Hispanic Ethnicity 0.71 (0.65-0.77)* 0.68 (0.61-0.75)* 0.75 (0.59-0.96)* 0.76 (0.50-1.15) 0.53 (0.44-0.65)* 0.74 (0.55-1.00)* 
Education Level       
   Less than High School 0.96 (0.87-1.05) 1.12 (0.98-1.28) 0.88 (0.71-1.08) 0.28 (0.12-0.63)* 0.44 (0.29-0.66)* 0.58 (0.35-0.95)* 
   High School 1.15 (1.10-1.20)* 1.25 (1.18-1.32)* 1.11 (0.99-1.24) 0.68 (0.48-0.95)* 1.16 (0.99-1.35) 0.67 (0.53-0.85)* 
   Some College 1.14 (1.11-1.18)* 1.15 (1.10-1.21)* 1.17 (1.07-1.26)* 0.72 (0.57-0.92)* 1.18 (1.05-1.33)* 1.01 (0.83-1.23) 
   College and Beyond Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Age  1.01 (1.01-1.01)* 1.01 (1.00-1.01)* 1.01 (1.00-1.01)* 0.94 (0.93-0.95)* 1.01 (1.00-1.02)* 1.00 (1.00-1.01) 
Year (Reference 2007)       
    2008 0.99 (0.95-1.02) 1.01 (0.98-1.04) 0.97 (0.90-1.04) 0.92 (0.83-1.01) 0.93 (0.87-0.98)* 0.98 (0.88-1.10) 
    2009 0.93 (0.90-0.97)* 0.98 (0.95-1.00) 0.91 (0.83-1.00) 0.88 (0.78-1.00)* 0.86 (0.80-0.92)* 0.93 (0.81-1.06) 
State of Residence 
Characteristics  
      
    PDMP Operational 1.03 (0.95-1.12) 0.73 (0.62-0.86)* 1.58 (1.20-2.09)* 1.14 (0.85-1.53) 0.65 (0.53-0.80)* 1.29 (0.91-1.83) 
    Proactive Prescribers 1.14 (1.04-1.26)* 1.10 (0.94-1.29) 1.25 (0.80-1.97) 1.61 (1.16-2.25)* 1.29 (0.88-1.90) 1.85 (1.34-2.55)* 
    Proactive Law 
Enforcement 
0.99 (0.94-1.06) 1.09 (0.95-1.24) 0.90 (0.71-1.14) 1.39 (1.14-1.69)* 1.07 (0.88-1.31) 0.88 (0.69-1.14) 
    Law Enforcement Access 1.01 (0.92-1.11) 1.27 (1.06-1.52)* 0.62 (0.46-0.85)* 0.98 (0.66-1.45) 0.89 (0.74-1.07) 1.02 (0.71-1.46) 
    Compulsory Registration 1.16 (1.06-1.27)* 1.06 (0.90-1.24) 1.83 (1.20-2.78)* 1.40 (0.83-2.36) 1.34 (1.09-1.64)* 1.58 (1.04-2.38)* 
    Compulsory Prescriber 
Use 
1.15 (1.01-1.31)* 0.92 (0.72-1.17) 2.08 (1.17-3.70)* 1.47 (0.86-2.53) 1.82 (1.21-2.73)* 2.16 (1.42-3.27)* 
    Interstate Data Sharing 1.08 (0.99-1.17) 1.01 (0.90-1.12) 1.22 (1.03-1.46)* 0.79 (0.60-1.04) 1.06 (0.92-1.22) 1.32 (0.87-2.00) 
    Data Transmission <1 
Week 
0.85 (0.75-0.95)* 0.89 (0.79-1.01) 0.63 (0.45-0.89)* 0.62 (0.34-1.13) 0.73 (0.58-0.93)* 0.54 (0.32-0.89)* 
    Schedule III Monitored 0.87 (0.74-1.01) 1.27 (0.95-1.69) 0.57 (0.29-1.12) 0.76 (0.26-2.14) 0.97 (0.60-1.58) 0.33 (0.19-0.56)* 
    Schedule V Monitored 0.95 (0.86-1.05) 1.06 (0.93-1.21) 0.57 (0.38-0.86)* 0.72 (0.35-1.49) 1.00 (0.83-1.21) 0.93 (0.61-1.40) 
    Unscheduled Substances 
Monitored 
0.98 (0.91-1.06) 0.96 (0.84-1.10) 0.99 (0.73-1.34) 0.86 (0.62-1.18) 1.03 (0.76-1.40) 1.30 (0.98-1.72) 
†IRR refers to Incidence Rate Ratio, abbreviated throughout the remaining chapters. 
‡CI refers to Confidence Interval, abbreviated throughout the remaining chapters. 
*Indicates statistically significant: p<0.05.
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Discussion 
 
Commercially insured patients are likely impacted by PDMP regulations 
differentially than those insured by Medicaid. In fact, several results in this 
analysis suggest that access to certain opioids increased to this population after 
PDMP regulations were strengthened or implemented as compared to the overall 
decrease in Schedule II opioid utilization by Medicaid patients found in the 
previous chapter.  
This increase in access to certain opioids suggests that compulsory 
prescriber PDMP use may have increased prescriber confidence in treatment 
decisions when prescribing certain opioids and opioids in general to their patients 
for pain, but just having an operational PDMP (and not necessarily a PDMP with 
compulsory use) would seem to decrease access to opioids such as 
hydrocodone and methadone while increasing access to oxycodone in this 
population. 
There are several limitations associated with this analysis. First, the 
exogenous impacts of changes in other policies, regulations, and clinical 
recommendations related to opioid prescribing are not controlled for in this 
analysis. Second, the definition of this population was limited to individuals who 
were continuously enrolled in the same, albeit large, insurer for the duration of 
the study period. This means that the prescription records of patients lost to plan 
switches or changes in eligibility status were not captured in this analysis, nor 
were patients under age 18 or over age 65, both of which age groups are 
included in the aggregate Medicaid data analysis in the previous chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Heroin Abuse Treatment Discharges and Opioid Prescriptions Dispensed in 
Kentucky 
 
Chapter Summary: This chapter delves into one of the more controversial relationships between 
state policy interventions for opioid abuse and the resulting possible unintended consequences 
by focusing on data collected from Kentucky. House Bill 1, a statute enacted by Kentucky 
legislature in 2012, called for tightening PDMP regulations to combat prescription opioid abuse. A 
potential relationship between the presumed restriction in prescription opioid supply and heroin 
abuse, by proxy of heroin abuse treatment discharge records, is explored using linked data 
between Kentucky’s PDMP records and substance abuse treatment facility discharges for fiscal 
years 2009-2013. Prescriptions for opioids for patients with and without heroin abuse treatment 
discharges are compared before and after the implementation of the policy. 
 
The Commonwealth of Kentucky enacted House Bill 1 in 2012,96 which 
required prescribers of controlled substances to register with and utilize 
Kentucky’s prescription drug monitoring program, known as the Kentucky All-
Schedule Prescription Electronic Reporting program (KASPER). House Bill 1 was 
intended to quell prescription opioid abuse; however, surveillance indicators 
suggest heroin abuse is on the rise while prescription opioid abuse has 
decreased in Kentucky.7,51  
Prescription opioid abuse deterrents have included changes to KASPER 
such as those mentioned above, reformulation of certain prescription opioids, 
tightening of pain clinic regulations, and changes in treatment guidelines for both 
pain management and opioid dependence. Heroin, an illicit opioid, may serve as 
a substitute for licit pharmaceutical opioids when persons with prescription opioid 
substance use disorders have difficulty obtaining their substance of preference. 
Research has established the co-occurrence of prescription opioid and heroin 
use for individuals receiving substance abuse treatment.97,98 However, 
prescription opioid access via licit channels has not been previously 
characterized for individuals discharged from substance abuse treatment 
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facilities. This missing piece represents a critical component for evaluating the 
unintended consequences associated with PDMP regulation changes such as 
HB1 that are primarily intended as “supply side” policies. Supply side policies are 
policies that cause a shift in supply (in this case, a downward shift in 
pharmaceutical opioid supply), that ultimately result in an excess of quantity of 
opioids demanded. Figure 5.1 provides an illustration of this theory. 
Figure 5.1 Supply Shift in the Market for Prescription Opioids 
 
Researchers who study the marketplace for prescription and “street” drugs 
have heatedly criticized supply-side policies, due to the lack of accompanying 
policy to address the excess demand once supply restrictions are enacted.99-101 
The process of continuously updating supply restrictions can be likened to a 
game of policy “whack-a-mole,” where new drug abuse and diversion problems 
pop up because substitutes are sought when the substance of preference 
becomes more difficult to obtain; a new policy is then required to control the 
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supply of the new substance or distribution channel, followed by another surge in 
new problematic substitutes or distribution channels, and so on, ad infinitum. The 
latest move in the prescription drug policy arms race may well be the illicit 
pharmaceutical opioid substitute heroin. This chapter explores the relationship 
between opioid prescriptions and heroin abuse by comparing prescription 
dispensation records to heroin abuse treatment facility discharges before and 
after the implementation of Kentucky’s House Bill 1. 
Methods 
 
Data was acquired from two sources: the Kentucky All-Schedule 
Prescription Electronic Record (KASPER) database, Kentucky’s PDMP that 
contains patient-level controlled substance prescription dispensing data, and 
patient-level substance abuse treatment facility discharge data from the 
Treatment Episodes Data Set (TEDS).  A linkage of these two datasets was 
conducted on patient identifiers by a third party honest broker from the Center for 
Clinical and Translational Sciences Enterprise Data Trust at the University of 
Kentucky. Linked data included all controlled substance prescriptions and 
substance abuse treatment facility discharges for the years 2009 through 2013. 
Please note the researcher did not have access to identifying patient information 
at any point in this process and worked with de-identified data transferred after 
the linkage was completed. University of Kentucky and Cabinet for Health and 
Family Services (CHFS) guidelines exempt this project from standalone 
Institutional Review Board review because the human subjects data is de-
identified,102 and use of this de-identified data for analysis was granted 
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permission by CHFS on June 24, 2014 with decision document CHFS-IRB-
OATS-FY14-38 (documentation available upon request). 
Prescriptions dispensed for pharmaceutical opioids were calculated by 
select opioid type and summed to the fiscal year at the patient level for fiscal 
years 2010-2013, where the pre-House Bill 1 period was defined as fiscal years 
2010-2012 and the post-House Bill 1 period was defined as fiscal year 2013. 
Fiscal years were selected as the unit of time for this analysis rather than 
calendar years due to the July 2012 implementation date of House Bill 1.  
The analysis contained several components. Patient characteristics and 
prescription history for dispensed opioids for patients with treatment discharges 
for heroin, opioid or other substances were compared to patients who did not 
experience a treatment discharge.   Additionally, trends in treatment discharges 
over time for heroin, pharmaceutical opioids and other substances were 
compared.   
An individual patient may have multiple treatment discharge events during 
the study period and may also report poly-abuse of substances within each 
episode of treatment. In the case of poly-abuse, the first three substances for 
which treatment is sought are included in counts of treatment discharges but the 
patient’s demographic characteristics are only counted once per treatment event. 
This convention was utilized to due its presence throughout TEDS record 
systems, where “primary” substance of abuse, “secondary” substance of abuse, 
and “tertiary” substance of abuse are listed by ranking of the patient as well as 
his/her treatment providers upon admission. 
 76 
Mean total opioid prescriptions for substance abuse treatment facility 
patients discharged for heroin abuse versus treatment facility patients discharged 
for the abuse of other non-opioid substances before and after House Bill 1 were 
compared using two-tailed t tests. Logistic regression models estimated the 
likelihood of treatment discharge for heroin relative to the discharge for other 
non-opioid substances, where the predictors were number of each type of opioid 
prescription with controls for age, gender, number of pharmacies dispensing to 
the patient, and number of providers prescribing to the patient.  
An alternative specification was constructed that included controls for 
previous discharges as well as an interaction term between year of discharge 
and number of previous discharges. A supplementary analysis with 
pharmaceutical opioid treatment discharges rather than heroin treatment 
discharges as the dependent variable was also conducted using the alternative 
specification. All analysis was conducted in Stata v13.95 
Results 
 
Alcohol represents the most widely used substance for which treatment is 
sought in Kentucky in every year examined, with the exception of 2011 when it 
was briefly overtaken by demand for treatment of non-heroin pharmaceutical 
opioid abuse. ‡  Substance abuse treatment for pharmaceutical opioids has 
declined since peaking in 2011, while heroin treatment has increased in this time 
(Figure 5.2). Poly-abuse of substances was most frequently reported in 
combination with alcohol (e.g., treatment sought for alcohol + pharmaceutical 
                                                     
‡ TEDS data uses the terminology ‘other opiates’ when classifying pharmaceutical 
opioids as a category of substances of abuse. 
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opioids, or treatment sought for alcohol + cocaine + amphetamines). The 
maximum number of treatment discharges for both heroin and pharmaceutical 
opioids by an individual patient was 15 discharges in the study period. Heroin 
treatment discharges represented 10.25 percent of all treatment discharges 
before the implementation of House Bill 1 and 21.81 percent post-House Bill 1 
(p<0.001).  
Figure 5.2 Substance Abuse Treatment Facility Admissions in Kentucky, by 
Substance and Year 
 
 
 
Patients discharged from treatment facilities were a mean of 35.51 years 
old as compared to a mean of 45.93 years old for Kentuckians with controlled 
substance prescriptions but no treatment discharges (p<0.001). Patients with 
treatment discharges were 46.90 percent female and patients with no treatment 
discharges 54.84 percent were female (p<0.001). Those with discharges visited a 
mean of 6.56 pharmacies (3.27 pharmacies if no treatment discharges, p<0.001), 
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and had a mean of 6.96 prescribers  (3.45 prescribers if no treatment discharges, 
p<0.001).  
In Table 5.1, opioid prescriptions dispensed to patients with treatment 
discharges for heroin, pharmaceutical opioids, and other substances are 
compared for the period leading up to HB1 (fiscal year 2010-2012) and following 
HB1 implementation (fiscal year 2013). Pre-House Bill 1 heroin discharge 
patients had greater mean opioid prescriptions compared to patients with other 
substance discharges, even when including opioid discharge patients (7.38 vs. 
7.29, p=NS). Heroin discharge patients, however, had fewer opioid prescriptions 
post-House Bill 1 (7.32 vs. 7.38, p=NS) when opioid discharge patients were 
included in the comparison group.  
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Table 5.1 Characteristics and Prescriptions Dispensed to Kentucky Patients Discharged from Substance Abuse 
Treatment 
 Pre-House Bill 1 (FY2010-2012) Post-House Bill 1 (FY2013) 
 Heroin  
Treatment 
Discharges 
(n=5,755) 
Opioid 
Treatment 
Discharges 
(n=20,090) 
Other Substance 
Treatment 
Discharges 
(n=48,116) 
Heroin  
Treatment 
Discharges 
(n=3,148) 
Opioid 
Treatment 
Discharges 
(n=5,085) 
Other Substance 
Treatment 
Discharges 
(n=11,720) 
Females 47.97% 51.16% 45.89% 46.07% 52.79% 46.35% 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Age at Discharge  32.25 (10.19) 33.71 
(10.67) 
35.62 (11.88) 31.76 (9.68) 34.17 (10.65) 34.46 (11.96) 
Prescribers 6.59 (6.67) 7.42 (7.13) 6.71 (6.66) 6.39 (6.68) 7.21 (6.66) 6.72 (6.51) 
Pharmacies 6.30 (6.28) 7.09 (6.60) 6.30 (6.05) 6.10 (6.29) 6.89 (6.25) 6.32 (5.94) 
Oxycodone Scripts 1.25 (3.50) 1.26 (3.52) 0.95 (2.90) 1.23 (3.58) 1.33 (3.66) 0.96 (2.87) 
Hydrocodone Scripts 3.46 (5.66) 3.75 (5.75) 3.64 (5.64) 3.63 (5.82) 3.95 (5.70) 3.77 (5.69) 
Hydromorphone Scripts 0.01 (0.26) 0.01 (0.22) 0.01 (0.25) 0.04 (0.54) 0.02 (0.39) 0.01 (0.32) 
Buprenorphine Scripts 1.50 (6.16) 2.28 (8.08) 1.12 (6.07) 1.43 (8.68) 1.93 (9.37) 1.17 (7.84) 
All Other Opioid Scripts 0.50 (2.37) 0.46 (2.16) 0.39 (1.95) 0.42 (1.79) 0.47 (2.34) 0.41 (2.01) 
TOTAL Opioid Scripts 7.38 (9.85) 8.70 (10.79) 6.93 (9.48) 7.32 (11.43) 8.53 (11.76) 7.08 (10.64) 
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Interestingly, patients who sought treatment for the abuse of any 
substance had higher mean opioid prescriptions than Kentuckians receiving 
controlled substance prescriptions but who did not seek substance abuse 
treatment (Table 5.2). Hydrocodone prescriptions were the most frequent opioid 
prescriptions amongst patients with treatment discharges as well as patients with 
controlled substance prescriptions but no treatment discharges (p<0.001). 
Patients with any treatment discharges had been dispensed significantly more 
hydrocodone than other types of opioids. 
Table 5.2 Mean Prescriptions for Kentucky Patients with and without Substance 
Abuse Treatment Discharges 
Mean Prescriptions Patients with ANY 
treatment 
discharges 
Patients with NO 
treatment 
discharges 
P-value 
Total Opioids 7.31 2.68 <0.001 
Oxycodone  1.02 0.39 <0.001 
Hydrocodone  3.69 1.52 <0.001 
Hydromorphone  0.01 0.01 0.031 
Buprenorphine  1.34 0.07 <0.001 
Other Opioids 0.41 0.29 <0.001 
 
Oxycodone prescriptions were significant predictors of heroin treatment 
discharge in each regression specification (Table 5.3, Table 5.4). 
Hydromorphone prescriptions were the most strongly correlated opioid with 
heroin treatment discharges (OR: 1.14, 95% CI: 1.05-1.24). Hydrocodone, 
buprenorphine, and other opioid prescriptions were also significant predictors of 
heroin treatment discharge (Table 5.3, Figure 5.3). Females were 9 percent less 
likely than males to have a heroin treatment discharge (OR: 0.91; 95% CI: 0.86-
0.96) and every year increase in age was associated with a 4 percent decrease 
in the odds of having a heroin treatment discharge.  
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Table 5.3 Patient Characteristics and Number of Opioid Prescriptions Associated 
with Heroin Treatment Discharges 
 Odds Ratio  95% Confidence 
Interval 
Fiscal Year   
   2010  Reference year --- 
   2011 1.30** 1.20 to 1.42 
   2012 1.86** 1.71 to 2.03 
   2013 3.27** 3.03 to 3.54 
Female 0.91** 0.86 to 0.96 
Age  0.96** 0.96 to 0.96 
Number of Prescribers 0.98** 0.96 to 0.99 
Number of Pharmacies 1.01 0.99 to 1.02 
Oxycodone Prescriptions 1.04** 1.03 to 1.05 
Hydrocodone Prescriptions 1.01** 1.00 to 1.02 
Hydromorphone Prescriptions 1.14** 1.05 to 1.24 
Buprenorphine Prescriptions 1.01** 1.00 to 1.01 
All Other Opioid Prescriptions 1.03** 1.02 to 1.04 
*Indicates statistically significant: p<0.05 
 
Figure 5.3 Patient Characteristics and Number of Opioid Prescriptions 
Associated with Heroin Treatment Discharges 
 
Table 5.4 includes results with controls for previous discharges and 
interactions between year of discharge and number of previous discharges. 
Females were 14 percent less likely to have a discharge for heroin than males 
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(95% CI: 0.82-0.92), but were 1.29 times more likely to have a treatment 
discharge for pharmaceutical opioids than males (95% CI: 1.24-1.34). 
Buprenorphine prescriptions were associated with an increased likelihood of 
treatment discharges for pharmaceutical opioids (OR: 1.08; 95% CI: 1.07-1.08).  
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Table 5.4 Alternative Specification: Patient Characteristics and Number of Opioid 
Prescriptions associated with Heroin and Opioid Discharges 
 Heroin Discharges Opioid Discharges 
 Odds Ratio  95% CI Odds Ratio 95% CI 
Fiscal Year     
   2010  Reference year --- Reference year --- 
   2011 1.33** 1.14 to 1.54 1.25** 1.15 to 1.35 
   2012 1.80** 1.55 to 2.10 1.58** 1.45 to 1.73 
   2013 4.31** 3.74 to 4.96 1.24** 1.14 to 1.36 
Female 0.86** 0.82 to 0.92 1.29** 1.24 to 1.34 
Age  0.96** 0.96 to 0.96 0.97** 0.97 to 0.97 
Number of Prescribers 0.98** 0.97 to 0.99 0.97** 0.96 to 0.98 
Number of 
Pharmacies 
1.01 0.99 to 1.02 1.05** 1.04 to 1.06 
Oxycodone 
Prescriptions 
1.04** 1.03 to 1.05 1.08** 1.07 to 1.09 
Hydrocodone 
Prescriptions 
1.01** 1.01 to 1.02 1.02** 1.01 to 1.02 
Hydromorphone 
Prescriptions 
1.14** 1.05 to 1.24 0.94 0.88 to 1.02 
Buprenorphine 
Prescriptions 
1.00 1.00 to 1.01 1.08** 1.07 to 1.08 
All Other Opioid 
Prescriptions 
1.03** 1.02 to 1.04 1.03** 1.02 to 1.04 
Number of Previous 
Discharges 
    
   0 Reference --- Reference --- 
   1 1.84** 1.69 to 2.00 1.51** 1.43 to 1.59 
   2 2.56** 2.31 to 2.84 1.75** 1.64 to 1.87 
   3 2.69** 2.34 to 3.06 1.97** 1.81 to 2.15 
   4 3.40** 2.92 to 3.96 2.34** 2.11 to 2.60 
   5 4.05** 3.36 to 4.87 2.07** 1.81 to 2.35 
   6 3.30** 2.62 to 3.96 2.06** 1.76 to 2.42 
   7 3.52** 2.68 to 4.62 1.42** 1.18 to 1.71 
   8 6.08** 4.53 to 8.15 4.31** 3.41 to 5.45 
   9 7.71** 5.57 to 10.66 1.87** 1.45 to 2.40 
   10 3.16** 1.83 to 5.45 2.75** 1.82 to 4.15 
   11 1 (single case) --- 2.75** 1.92 to 3.95 
   12 4.95** 2.83 to 8.64 1.10 0.73 to 1.67 
   13 1 (single case) --- 3.76** 2.22 to 6.35 
   14 1 (single case) --- 1 (single case) --- 
Interaction: Previous 
Discharges and Year 
    
   n discharges X 2011 0.98 0.95 to 1.02 0.97* 0.95 to 0.99 
   n discharges X 2012 1.08** 1.03 to 1.12 0.99 0.97 to 1.02 
   n discharges X 2013 0.98 0.95 to 1.02 1.05** 1.11 to 1.30 
*Indicates statistically significant: p<0.05. 
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Discussion 
 
Although opioid prescribing decreased overall during the study period 
among all persons in Kentucky receiving controlled substance prescriptions, 
hydrocodone and hydromorphone prescriptions increased among heroin 
treatment discharge patients following the implementation of House Bill 1. This 
finding suggests that the PDMP and prescribing provisions in House Bill 1 may 
have influenced which substances were preferred in opioid-seeking behaviors. 
Alternatively, HB1 may have influenced shifts in prescribing behaviors.  
The findings of this analysis also indicate that prescription opioid 
consumption amongst individuals with substance abuse treatment stays for any 
substance, even non-opioid substances, is higher than prescription opioid 
consumption in the Kentucky population as a whole. This lends further support to 
the theory that substance use disorders tend to develop into poly-abuse when 
the supply of the preferred substance becomes limited or sporadic. PDMPs and 
other prescription opioid abuse deterrent policies and regulations have been 
enacted with almost exclusive supply-side restrictions of prescription opioids, 
while few policies have attempted to curb demand via the expansion of treatment 
opportunities or increased public insurance coverage of rigorous treatment 
options. The implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 enabled participating states to expand their Medicaid eligibility and 
coverage to include “essential” treatments for substance use disorders;103 
however, the substance use disorder treatments recommended for 
reimbursement and classified as “essential” are typically behavioral and 
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counseling-based treatments and place substantial barriers on evidence-based 
medication assisted therapies.104  
There are several limitations in this study. First, substance abuse 
treatment data from private-pay only facilities was not available in the TEDS 
dataset, which means that it is difficult to generalize prescription opioid trends 
amongst patients enrolled in these mixed public and private pay treatment 
facilities to the patient population who enrolled in private-pay only facilities. Next, 
prescription data from KASPER was not available for opioid prescriptions that 
were dispensed during inpatient hospital stays or to patients that were dispensed 
opioids as part of a medication-assisted substance abuse treatment regimen 
(i.e., buprenorphine prescribed by a Primary Care Physician would appear in 
KASPER data, but buprenorphine dispensed by an outpatient clinic in 
conjunction with a medication-assisted treatment program would not appear in 
KASPER data). Lastly, treatment discharge records and prescription data for 
patients that received treatment and prescriptions across state lines were not 
available from either data source. It is possible that some Kentuckians sought 
health care services involving controlled substances or treatment from providers 
in other states following the tightening of pain clinic regulations and PDMP usage 
as outlined in HB1. Despite these limitations, there appears to be a relationship 
between prescription opioid utilization and heroin abuse that merits further 
exploration. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
The Impact of Naloxone Access Policies on Opioid Overdose Deaths 
 
Chapter Summary: This final empirical chapter explores other state-level policy interventions in 
opioid abuse and diversion by widening the focus from PDMP programs to include broader opioid 
intervention policies, namely naloxone access laws. Naloxone is a medication used to reverse 
heroin and/or pharmaceutical opioid overdose, which some states have made more widely 
available to consumers at risk of overdose. This analysis examines the relationship between 
naloxone access policies and PDMPs with opioid overdose mortality using data from the CDC for 
1999-2012.  
 
Pharmaceutical opioid and/or heroin overdoses, largely reversible with 
timely administration of a medication called naloxone,105 have risen substantially 
since 1999. In fact, unintentional opioid overdose poisoning deaths have now 
surpassed vehicle accidents as the number one cause of injury death in adult 
citizens of the United States.73 Naloxone is not a controlled substance, but has 
been traditionally administered by medical professionals in an emergency 
department environment. The time-sensitive nature of administration for 
successful overdose reversal, coupled with a low potential for abuse, has 
prompted several states to implement policies that increase access to naloxone 
for individuals at risk of opioid and/or heroin overdose.   
Naloxone distribution programs have been declared successes by cities 
and states that have implemented them. Between 1996-2010, naloxone was 
distributed by these programs to 53,032 persons nationwide, which resulted in 
10,171 overdose reversals.106 The majority of injectable users report willingness 
to administer naloxone to others during an overdose (88.5 percent), particularly if 
they have used heroin, or have witnessed or have had an overdose 
themselves.107 This street-level treatment option for overdose has been hailed as 
a lifesaver where authorized, due to the relatively high prevalence of overdose 
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experiences in self-reported users of injected substances such as heroin. In a 
survey of 329 people using injected drugs, Lagu et al. (2006) found that 34.6 
percent had experienced an overdose themselves and 64.6 percent had 
witnessed an overdose.107 
In addition to naloxone distribution programs, which are typically 
implemented by city or local health departments, states have implemented 
policies to increase access to naloxone where outright distribution is not 
available. Three of these naloxone access policies are examined in this analysis: 
the authority of prescribers to write prescriptions for third parties (e.g., a parent 
could receive a naloxone prescription for their child if they felt he/she was at risk 
for overdose), standing order prescriptions (e.g., a state director of public health 
or similar official may “write” a prescription for all persons in the state, meaning 
that naloxone would be available for purchase at pharmacies without an explicit 
prescription, or non-prescribers such as pharmacists may dispense without a 
prescription), and prescriber immunity policies that protect prescribers from 
liability in case the party receiving naloxone on their behalf experiences overdose 
mortality or morbidity. Pilot studies evaluating these naloxone access policies 
have found evidence for the effectiveness of third party prescribing, in particular, 
for reducing heroin overdose deaths in communities where the practice is 
permitted.108 The purpose of this piece is to determine whether these state 
naloxone access policies may have contributed to changes in state opioid 
overdose mortality rates.  
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Methods 
 
Data for the dependent variable, pharmaceutical opioid and heroin 
overdose deaths per state-year from 1999-2012, were obtained from the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention’s Wide-Ranging Online Data for 
Epidemiological Research (WONDER) database. Deaths were identified using 
the following International Classification of Disease version 10 codes for opioid 
poisoning: X40-44 for accidental poisoning deaths, X60-64 for intentional 
poisoning deaths, and Y10-14 for poisoning deaths of undetermined intent. 
These codes were coupled with underlying substance codes of T40.0-40.4, 
representing opium, heroin, “other” opioids, methadone, synthetic opioids, or 
T40.6, representing unspecified opioids. Diagnosis codes and underlying 
substance codes were identified based on reviews of the literature as well as a 
line-item review of the International Classification of Disease billing code 
diagnoses listings.109-112 A state-year death total was not included in WONDER if 
there were fewer than 10 overdose deaths attributed to a particular substance in 
a given state and year, for decedent privacy protection. 
The presence of state naloxone access policies, including third party 
naloxone prescribing authorization, standing order prescriptions and prescriber 
immunity laws, were operationalized as independent dummy variables at the 
month-year of implementation. Implementation dates and formal definitions of 
state statutes meeting the criteria to be classified as one of these three policies 
were derived from the National Institute on Drug Abuse’s and Legal Science 
Partner’s 2012 report on Naloxone Overdose Prevention Laws.113 The 
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distribution of count of overdose deaths were found to be over-dispersed 
(variance>mean); therefore, a negative binomial, time series regression model 
with state and year fixed effects was constructed to estimate the relationship 
between naloxone access policy implementation and opioid overdose deaths. 
Lag years of the dependent variable (deaths) were used to address potential 
endogeneity problems. State-level control variables included: state population, 
operational PDMP, PDMP characteristics as defined in Chapter 2, and state 
average annual unemployment rate.  
Results 
 
During the study period, eight states implemented at least one of the three 
naloxone access policies examined: New Mexico, New York, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Washington state. Nationally, 
mean state pharmaceutical opioid overdoses increased 4 fold during the study 
period, while mean heroin overdoses also increased but at a much slower rate 
(Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 State Mean and Median Opioid Overdose Deaths, 1999-2012 
Year Pharmaceutical Opioid Overdoses Heroin Overdoses 
 Mean (SD) Median Mean (SD) Median 
1999 72.63 (152.15) 32 88.61 (151.58) 23 
2000 81.49 (117.37) 50 85.02 (127.43) 30 
2001 102.53 (116.51) 92 83.84 (123.28) 31 
2002 141.57 (188.50) 116 94.98 (143.04) 33 
2003 162.86 (194.08) 120 95.08 (137.78) 33 
2004 189.12 (215.79) 140 83.29 (114.31) 35 
2005 209.80 (210.33) 164 87.84 (117.14) 41 
2006 264.94 (261.29) 214 90.78 (124.07) 34 
2007 279.18 (281.34) 231 92.27 (121.05) 44 
2008 286.39 (295.40) 224 108.51 (135.56) 61 
2009 302.47 (327.72) 216 107.98 (136.23) 53 
2010 322.04 (340.28) 229 98.02 (129.75) 48 
2011 328.53 (336.84) 256 130.80 (159.39) 84 
2012 319.54 (292.92) 260 182.22 (202.39) 117 
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For a glimpse into recent overdose mortality trends specific to Kentucky, 
Figure 6.1 was created with data from Kentucky Office of Vital Statistics.114 The 
black vertical line represents the implementation of House Bill 1 in Kentucky in 
July 2012, which was discussed in the previous chapter. Kentucky, specifically, 
experienced an upward trend in heroin overdose mortality from 2011 through 
2013, while pharmaceutical opioid overdose mortality trended downwards.  
Figure 6.1 Overdose Deaths in Kentucky, by Substance for 2009-2013 
 
States authorizing third party naloxone prescriptions experienced 35% 
fewer pharmaceutical opioid overdose deaths per year after policy 
implementation (95% CI: 0.46-0.95), but no statistically significant change in 
pharmaceutical opioid overdose deaths were observed in states that 
implemented standing order prescriptions and prescriber immunity. No significant 
change in heroin overdose deaths was observed in states authorizing third party 
prescriptions, standing order prescriptions, or prescriber immunity (Table 6.2). 
Operational PDMP presence was associated with 10.55 times greater heroin 
overdoses (95% CI: 4.75-23.44), and there were also relationships between 
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increased heroin overdoses with PDMP interstate data sharing (IRR: 1.37; 95% 
CI: 1.12-1.68), data transmission occurring more frequently than once per week 
(IRR: 1.89; 95% CI: 1.53-2.34), as well as the monitoring of Schedule V 
substances (IRR: 1.77; 95% CI 1.35-2.32). The monitoring of Schedule III 
substances was associated with a 90 percent decrease in heroin overdoses 
(95% CI: 0.04-0.24) and controls for time accounted for minor relationships with 
heroin overdose.  
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Table 6.2 The Association between Pharmaceutical Opioid and Heroin Overdose 
Deaths with Naloxone Access Policy Implementation 
 
 
Variable Description 
Opioid Overdose Heroin Overdose 
 
IRR (95% CI) IRR (95% CI) 
Naloxone Policy Variables   
  Prescriber Immunity  1.14 (0.93-1.40) 0.93 (0.78-1.11) 
  Standing Order Prescriptions 1.22 (0.81-1.84) 0.98 (0.56-1.72) 
  Third Party Naloxone Prescriptions  0.65 (0.46-0.95)* 0.89 (0.53-1.49) 
PDMP Covariates   
   PDMP Operational 1.66 (1.04-2.67)* 10.55 (4.75-23.44)* 
   Proactive Prescriber 0.81 (0.68-0.97)* 0.73 (0.53-1.01) 
   Proactive Law Enforcement 1.00 (0.85-1.17) 0.95 (0.74-1.21) 
   Law Access 1.08 (0.89-1.32) 1.21 (0.88-1.66) 
   Compulsory Registration 0.95 (0.82-1.11) 0.99 (0.78-1.26) 
   Compulsory Prescriber Use 0.88 (0.73-1.05) 0.81 (0.60-1.09) 
   Interstate Data Sharing 1.02 (0.91-1.05) 1.37 (1.12-1.68)* 
   Data Transmission <1 Week 1.26 (1.11-1.44)* 1.89 (1.53-2.34)* 
   Schedule III Monitored 0.69 (0.42-1.15) 0.10 (0.04-0.24)* 
   Schedule V Monitored 1.22 (1.04-1.43)* 1.77 (1.35-2.32)* 
   Unscheduled Substances Monitored 0.79 (0.67-0.94)* 0.80 (0.60-1.07) 
Other Covariates   
   State Population 1.00 (1.00-1.00)* 1.00 (1.00-1.00)* 
   Average Annual Unemployment Rate 0.99 (0.96-1.02) 0.97 (0.92-1.03) 
Year (reference 2000)   
   2001 1.36 (1.07-1.75)* 0.92 (0.75-1.11) 
   2002 2.03 (1.60-2.58)* 0.80 (0.62-1.02) 
   2003  2.75 (2.19-3.46)* 0.99 (0.80-1.23) 
   2004 3.24 (2.59-4.05)* 0.97 (0.78-1.20) 
   2005 3.99 (3.20-4.96)* 0.85 (0.69-1.04) 
   2006 4.40 (3.54-5.46)* 0.83 (0.67-1.03) 
   2007 5.48 (4.42-6.79)* 0.81 (0.65-0.99)* 
   2008 5.77 (4.62-7.20)* 0.88 (0.68-1.10) 
   2009 6.40 (4.90-8.37)* 1.22 (0.86-1.72) 
   2010  6.42 (4.88-8.46)* 1.24 (0.86-1.78) 
   2011 6.88 (5.29-8.95)* 1.02 (0.73-1.42) 
   2012 6.94 (5.39-8.93)* 1.30 (0.96-1.75) 
Total State-Years (n) 663 598 
*Indicates statistically significant: p<0.05. 
 
The magnitude of the relationship between opioid overdose deaths in 
states with operational PDMPs (IRR: 1.66; 95% CI: 1.04-2.67) is overshadowed 
substantially by the magnitude of the relationship with heroin overdose deaths, 
though both are positively associated. 
Pharmaceutical opioid overdoses have similar relationships to PDMP 
features as heroin overdoses, with observed increases in opioid overdoses 
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among states with Schedule V monitoring (IRR: 1.22; 95% CI: 1.04-1.43) and 
increases in opioid overdoses among states with data transmission more 
frequently than once per week (IRR: 1.26; 95% CI: 1.11-1.44).  Proactive or 
unsolicited reports to prescribers from PDMPs, however, appear to be 
significantly associated with decreases in pharmaceutical opioid overdose deaths 
(IRR: 0.81; 95% CI: 0.68-0.97), but not with heroin overdose deaths. The 
passage of time is also more significantly associated with increases in 
pharmaceutical opioid deaths, whereas heroin overdose deaths have increased 
slowly throughout the study period. 
Discussion 
 
Findings from this analysis demonstrate that decreases in heroin overdose 
death rates observed in states with expanded implementation of naloxone 
access policies were not statistically significant. However, pharmaceutical opioid 
death rates have slowed in states with third party naloxone prescriptions. It is 
possible that the naloxone access policies examined in this chapter were 
enacted in states with particularly severe heroin epidemics, so the rate of heroin 
overdose deaths may have been slowed by these policies in a manner unable to 
be captured by this type of analysis. 
Research on optimal naloxone access laws and their implementation is 
needed as naloxone has few documented negative health effects and has been 
determined to be a cost-effective method of saving lives.115 It should be noted 
that this analysis has several limitations. Most significantly, there is no control for 
the extent of naloxone access policy enforcement in the states that implemented 
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the examined policies. Also, there is no control for exogenous events and trends 
that possibly contributed to changes in opioid overdose mortality beyond PDMP 
features. Other contributing factors to the observed downward mortality trends in 
some states could include the “methadone migration” (a term I use to describe 
changing prescribing preferences for buprenorphine/naloxone combination 
products over the traditional, but overdose-prone, methadone in medication-
assisted substance abuse treatment programs), the implementation of needle 
exchange programs, or states that enhanced substance abuse treatment 
availability during the study period. Lastly, this analysis does not capture 
overdoses that did not result in deaths. Future expansions of this analysis should 
include emergency department discharge data for non-fatal opioid overdose 
treatment. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
Chapter Summary: The final chapter concludes the dissertation by re-iterating themes observed 
throughout the empirical analyses and synthesizing these findings to expand the existing policy 
implementation and evaluation literature on state-level interventions in opioid abuse and 
diversion. Recommendations for future PDMP policy are presented and discussed.  
 
The law enforcement and medical communities have expressed markedly 
different perspectives for the most effective methods of defining and solving the 
problem of prescription drug abuse and diversion.  Some of these differences are 
most apparent in the language used to describe their respective goals and policy 
recommendations.  For example, law enforcement communities tend to define 
prescription drug abuse and diversion in terms of a problem to be met with by 
force (e.g., the war on drugs, the drug threat), whereas the medical community 
tends to define the problem using terminology such as “epidemic” or “crisis of 
abuse.” This difference in perspective has become even more apparent as policy 
efforts to combat the problem from both law enforcement and medical 
communities have been met with few measureable successes. Reports and 
statements about PDMPs issued by health agencies tend to make references to 
the Principle of Balance, which is the effort to reduce abuse and diversion while 
providing access to controlled substances for legitimate medical need, and 
reports and statements issued by law enforcement agencies typically neglect to 
include this language. 
The Department of Justice releases an annual publication titled “The 
National Drug Threat Assessment”, which features an analysis on nationwide 
drug crime and reports from lower level regional and district officials. An annual 
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survey of local law enforcement conducted from 2005 to 2009 found that officials 
have steadily increased their perceptions of prescription drugs, particularly 
opioids, as the greatest “drug threat” to their region (3.9 percent in 2005 to 9.8 
percent in 2009).20 The nomenclature used to describe the drugs themselves in 
these types of publications is noticeably different between law enforcement 
agencies and health agencies. For example, law enforcement agencies and the 
court systems tend to use the ill-defined term “narcotic” when describing certain 
controlled substances, whereas health agencies and clinicians often use more 
clinically-specific drug class terms, such as “opioid”, “sedative”, or “stimulant;”1 
however, it is interesting to note that law enforcement and health agencies seem 
equally likely to use the terms “opiate” and “opioid” interchangeably despite the 
problems of using the oft too-specific “opiate.” On an even more fundamental 
level, substances are more likely to be referred to by one of several clinically 
oriented terms (e.g. medications, drug therapy, prescription drugs, and 
nonmedical versus medical use of prescription drugs) by health agencies and 
health professionals, whereas law enforcement agencies tend to avoid these 
qualifiers by using the catch-all term “drugs” to describe almost any type of 
ingested, injected, or inhaled substance for medical or nonmedical use.   
Additionally, the law enforcement communities and medical communities 
have both developed the problematic tendency to refer to persons with 
substance use disorders using reductive, and sometimes hostile, language. 
Terms like “addict” are commonplace in law enforcement documentation 
whereas the clinically equivalent version “abuser” crops up equally as often in 
 97 
medical literature written by health professionals whose specialties lay outside 
the treatment of substance use disorder. If an effort was made to agree upon the 
language used in the reporting and research of controlled substance trends, then 
there may be increased potential for more productive collaboration between law 
enforcement, health agencies, and the communities who face the brunt of 
prescription opioid abuse and diversion problems with fewer tensions.  
Policy Implications 
 
 Changes in the marketplace for prescription opioids, one of the most 
widely prescribed classes of controlled substances, could have implications 
throughout the health care system for insurers who reimburse for opioids, for 
providers who treat patients with opioids and for opioid use-related disorders, 
and for patient-consumers who may face barriers to access for opioids or barriers 
to access for treatment of opioid use disorders. Any changes in the quantity of 
prescription medications reimbursed by Medicaid, in particular, represent 
significant shifts in the marketplace for prescription drugs, as Medicaid is the 
largest health insurer in the United States.116  
State Medicaid programs are dispensing (or, more accurately, 
reimbursing) an increasing amount of controlled substances each year, but 
states that have implemented PDMPs tend to dispense fewer total units of 
controlled substances to their respective Medicaid beneficiaries. The presence of 
a PDMP would appear to be influencing changes in prescriber and dispenser 
behavior, but specific PDMP policy characteristics, such as the ability to share 
data with other state PDMPs, shape the nature of that behavior change. The 
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decrease in both higher and lower Scheduled controlled substance dispensing in 
states with operational PDMPs would suggest that prescribers and dispensers 
may possibly be suffering from a “chilling effect” (a reduction in 
prescribing/dispensing due to fears of investigation), but the increase of units of 
all Scheduled substances dispensed in states with law enforcement-housed 
PDMPs would seem to contradict this notion. Perhaps providers are more 
confident in making prescribing and dispensing decisions in states that 
encourage access to consumer use history information when endorsed by law 
enforcement agencies.  
 PDMP policies were intended to reduce abuse and diversion, but the 
observed national increases in overdose mortality as well as substance abuse 
treatment admissions since widespread state PDMP implementation implies that 
these policies have not achieved this goal; however, it is possible that PDMP 
policies have tempered the upward abuse trend. The coordination of state 
program information sharing and the implementation of more-uniform PDMP 
policies could intensify the intended impact of PDMPs, particularly if the intended 
user groups are afforded adequate access to program data and the training to 
use that data appropriately.  
Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
It is recommended that state-level PDMP programs reconcile statutes with 
agency regulations (e.g., clarify professional licensure board requirements versus 
“guidelines” for registration and participation), in cases where these bodies 
experience conflicting language or when agencies have limited ability or 
 99 
resources to implement the regulations they have been charged with enacting. 
For example, it is widely cited by state PDMPs and PDMP advocacy groups that 
“most” states have interstate data-sharing capabilities, and while it is true that 
most states have approved agreements to transmit interstate data, the reality is 
that as of 2015 only 27 states have been able to successfully transmit data 
across state lines and the majority of these transmissions are limited to border 
states.  
It is also recommended that states expand monitoring to lower Scheduled 
substances if they are currently exempt from the PDMP, and to petition the FDA 
and DEA to reconcile state-level Scheduling with the federal Schedule. Several 
states have re-Scheduled upward substances such as hydrocodone and 
tramadol due to perceived uptake in abuse and it is apparent that these states 
respond to changes in problematic substance use more quickly than the federal 
agencies.  
Reconciliation between federal agency regulations and state PDMP 
policies on law enforcement access is also recommended. The DEA, FBI, and 
other federal investigative bodies are permitted to access state PDMP data 
pursuant to active investigations, but this conflicts with some state laws that 
restrict law enforcement access to PDMP data to cases where the investigative 
body has a warrant, court order, or subpoena issued by a court within the state. 
This conflict has come to a head recently in the state of Oregon, where Oregon’s 
PDMP in conjunction with the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit against the 
DEA for unwarranted requests to access Oregon’s PDMP data. While a U.S. 
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Circuit Court ruled in Oregon’s favor in 2014, the DEA has since issued an 
appeal.63 
It is also recommended that evaluations of PDMPs should continue to be 
conducted so that states can process relevant outcomes data regarding the 
effectiveness of such PDMP features as pharmacy data reporting frequency and 
compulsory prescriber use. A crucial missing component in the formulation of 
variables for PDMP features was the participation rates of prescribers, 
pharmacists, and law enforcement officials in states that do not mandate usage. 
Information about the frequency of use and the change in prescriber or dispenser 
behavior resulting from PDMP use would provide a more complete measurement 
tool of PDMP impact on dispensing and so it is recommended that state PDMPs 
publish these data when available. Policy recommendations for related opioid 
interventions, primarily naloxone access, are more difficult to formulate. It is still 
unclear whether the observed trends in decreased opioid deaths in some states 
were due to the changes in state-level naloxone access laws or to exogenous 
factors. The results from the analyses conducted in the Chapters 5 and 6 
suggest that there is an association between PDMPs, naloxone policy 
interventions, substance abuse treatment enrollment, and overdose mortality, but 
causality and the direction of this relationship has not been established with 
certainty. 
The use of “real world” data sources in this project included: aggregate 
reimbursement claims from Medicaid, patient-level prescription data from 
commercial health insurance, a novel data linkage between substance abuse 
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facility records with individual controlled substance prescription histories from a 
state PDMP, and publicly available policy and epidemiological data. The 
analyses conducted throughout this project suggest the conclusion that the state 
interventions in prescription opioid abuse in diversion known as PDMPs have 
influenced far-reaching facets of the United States population’s health and safety, 
such as; as consumer health outcomes by way of changes in substance abuse 
treatment prevalence and changes in access to pain management care, the 
market for prescription opioids and possibly illicit heroin substitutes, and health 
care provider behaviors related to the treatment of pain and substance use 
disorders.  
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APPENDIX A  
PDMP Year Enacted and Year Operational, as of 2015 
State Year 
Enacted 
Year 
Operational 
State Year 
Enacted 
Year 
Operational 
Alabama 2004 2007 Nebraska 2011 2011 
Alaska 2008 2012 Nevada 1995 1997 
Arizona 2007 2008 New Hampshire 2012 2014 
Arkansas 2011 2013 New Jersey 2008 2012 
California 1939 2009 New Mexico 2004 2005 
Colorado 2005 2008 New York 1972 1973 
Connecticut 2006 2008 North Carolina 2005 2007 
Delaware 2010 2012 North Dakota 2005 2008 
Florida 2009 2011 Ohio 2005 2006 
Georgia 2011 2013 Oklahoma 1990 2006 
Hawaii 1943 1996 Oregon 2009 2011 
Idaho 1986 1998 Pennsylvania 1972 1973 
Illinois 1961 1999 Rhode Island 1978 2001 
Indiana 1997 2007 South Carolina 2006 2008 
Iowa 2006 2009 South Dakota 2010 2012 
Kansas 2008 2011 Tennessee 2003 2007 
Kentucky 1998 1999 Texas 1981 1989 
Louisiana 2006 2009 Utah 1995 1997 
Maine 2003 2005 Vermont 2006 2009 
Maryland 2011 2014 Virginia 2002 2006 
Massachusetts 1992 2010 Washington 2007 2012 
Michigan 1988 2003 West Virginia* 2002 2002 
Minnesota 2007 2010 Wisconsin 2010 2013 
Mississippi 2005 2005 Wyoming 2004 2005 
Missouri --- --- District of 
Columbia 
2014 2015 
Montana 2011 2012 
*Note: West Virginia originally adopted PDMP legislation in 1995; it was repealed soon after, and 
then replaced with the contemporary version in 2002.  
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APPENDIX B  
Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions for 2000 and 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Hernandez S, Nelson L. Prescription drug abuse: Insight into the 
epidemic. Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics. 2010;88(3):307-317. 
2. Levi J, Segal LM, Fuchs Miller A. Prescription Drug Abuse: Strategies to 
Stop the Epidemic. Washington, DC: Trust for America's Health October, 
2013 2013. 
3. National Drug Threat Assessment 2011. 2011; 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf. Accessed 
2011. 
4. Results from the 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary 
of National Findings. 2012; 
http://archive.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2011SummNatFindDetTables/. 
Accessed January 30, 2014. 
5. Manchikanti L. Prescription drug abuse: what is being done to address this 
new drug epidemic? Testimony before the subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. Pain Physician. 
2006;9(4):287-321. 
6. Daubresse M, Chang H, Yu Y, et al. Ambulatory diagnosis and treatment 
of nonmalignant pain in the United States, 2000-2010. Medical Care. 
2013;51(10):870-878. 
7. National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2011 and 2012. 2013; 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-
 105 
DetTabs2012/NSDUH-DetTabs2012/PDFW/NSDUH-
DetTabsSect1peTabs88to92-2012.pdf. Accessed January 3, 2015. 
8. Barrett K, Watson A. Physician perspectives on a pilot prescription 
monitoring program. Journal of Pain and Palliative Care 
Pharmacotherapy. 2005;19(3):5-13. 
9. Feldman L, Williams KS, Coates J, Knox M. Awareness and Utilization of 
a Prescription Monitoring Program Among Physicians. Journal of Pain and 
Palliative Care Pharmacotherapy. 2011;Early Online:1-5. 
10. Freeman P, Blumenschein K, Fink J, Steinke D, Talbert J. Independent 
Evaluation of the KASPER Program. 2010. Accessed 7/24/2011. 
11. Simeone R, Holland L. An evaluation of prescription drug monitoring 
programs. 2006; 1-45. Available at: 
http://www.simeoneassociates.com/simeone3.pdf. 
12. Fishman SM. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Serve a Vital Clinical 
Need. Pain Medicine. 2011;12(6):845-845. 
13. Brushwood D. Maximizing the value of electronic prescription monitoring 
programs. Journal of Law Med and Ethics. 2003;31(1):41-54. 
14. Morgan L, Weaver M, Sayeed Z, Orr R. The use of prescription monitoring 
programs to reduce opioid diversion and improve patient safety. Journal of 
Pain and Palliative Care Pharmacotherapy. 2013;27(1):4-9. 
15. Reifler LM, Droz D, Bailey JE, et al. Do Prescription Monitoring Programs 
Impact State Trends in Opioid Abuse/Misuse? Pain Medicine. 
2012;13:434-442. 
 106 
16. Naloxone Overdose Prevention Laws.  
http://lawatlas.org/query?dataset=laws-regulating-administration-of-
naloxone. Accessed December 1, 2014. 
17. Institute of Medicine CoAPR, Care, and Education. Relieving Pain in 
America: A Blueprint for Transforming Prevention, Care, Education, and 
Research. The National Academies Press; 6/29/2011. 
18. Katz N, Houle B, Fernandez KC, et al. Update on Prescription Monitoring 
in Clinical Practice: A Survey Study of Prescription Monitoring Program 
Administrators. Pain Medicine. 2008;9(5):587-594. 
19. A Call to Revolutionize Chronic Pain Care in America: An Opportunity in 
Health Care Reform. May, 2009; http://www.maydaypainreport.org/docs/A 
Call to Revolutionize%20Chronic%20Pain%20Care%20in%20America.pdf 
Accessed 7/24/2011. 
20. National drug threat assessment. In: Justice USDo, ed. Johnstown, PA: 
National Drug Intelligence Center; 2010:1-76. 
21. Controlled Substance Schedules and List of Controlled Substances.  
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/index.html, 2011. 
22. Gilson AM, Joranson DE, Maurer MA. Improving State Pain Policies: 
Recent Progress and Continuing Opportunities. CA: A Cancer Journal for 
Clinicians. 2007;57(6):341-353. 
23. Fishman SM, Papazian JS, Gonzalez S, Riches PS, Gilson A. Regulating 
Opioid Prescribing Through Prescription Monitoring Programs: Balancing 
Drug Diversion and Treatment of Pain. Pain Medicine. 2004;5(3):309-324. 
 107 
24. Medicaid: Fraud and abuse related to controlled substances identified in 
selected states. GAO-09-957 2009; 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09957.pdf. 
25. Medicare Part D: Instances of questionable access to prescription drugs. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office (GAO);2011. 
26. Manchikanti L, Whitfield E, Pallone F. Evolution of the National All 
Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting Act (NASPER): a public law 
for balancing treatment of pain and drug abuse and diversion. Pain 
Physician. 2005;8(4):335-347. 
27. Policy Brief: Leveraging PDMPs to Reduce Drug Use. Strategic Policy 
Solutions 2011; http://www.carnevaleassociates.com/pmp_brief_4-13-
11.pdf. 
28. Wilsey B, Fishman S, Gilson A, et al. Profiling multiple provider prescribing 
of opioids, benzodiazepines, stimulants, and anorectics. Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence. 2010;112(1-2):99-106. 
29. Alliance of States with Prescription Monitoring Programs. 2011; 
http://www.pmpalliance.org. 
30. Blumenschein K, Fink J, Freeman P, Steinke D, Talbert J. Review of 
prescription drug monitoring programs in the United States. Lexington, KY: 
Institute for Pharmaceutical Outcomes and Policy, University of Kentucky; 
June, 2010 2010. 
31. Manchikanti L. National drug control policy and prescription drug abuse: 
facts and fallacies. Pain Physician. 2007;10(3):399-424. 
 108 
32. Wang J, Christo PJ. The influence of prescription monitoring programs on 
chronic pain management. Pain Physician. 2009;12:507-515. 
33. Prescription drug monitoring programs. Fact Sheet April 2011; 
https://http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/pdmp.pdf. Accessed 11/10/11. 
34. Paulozzi LJ, Kilbourne EM, Desai HA. Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs and Death Rates from Drug Overdose. Pain Medicine. 
2011;12(5):747-754. 
35. Flinklea KM, Bagalman E, Sacco LN. Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs. In: United States Congressional Research Service PfMaCoC, 
ed2012. 
36. Prescription Drugs: State Monitoring Programs Provide Useful Tool to 
Reduce Diversion. Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office 
(GAO);2002. 
37. Katz N, Panas L, Kim M, et al. Usefulness of prescription monitoring 
programs for surveillance—analysis of Schedule II opioid prescription data 
in Massachusetts, 1996–2006. Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug Safety. 
2010;19(2):115-123. 
38. Gilson A, Fishman S, Wilsey B, Casamalhuapa C, Baxi H. Time series 
analysis of California's prescription monitoring program: impact on 
prescribing and mulitple provider episodes. Journal of Pain. 2011;In Press, 
Avalable online from November 23, 2011:1-9. 
 109 
39. Han H, Kass PH, Wilsey BL, Li C-S. Individual and County-Level Factors 
Associated with Use of Multiple Prescribers and Multiple Pharmacies to 
Obtain Opioid Prescriptions in California. PLOS ONE. 2012;7(9):1-8. 
40. Baehren D, Marco C, Droz D, Sinha S, Callan E, Akpunonu P. A statewide 
prescription monitoring program affects emergency department 
prescribing behaviors. Annals of Emergency Medicine. 2010;56(1):19-23. 
41. Curtis LH, Stoddard J, Radeva JI, et al. Geographic Variation in the 
Prescription of Schedule II Opioid Analgesics among Outpatients in the 
United States. Health Services Research. 2006;41(3p1):837-855. 
42. Reisman R, Shenoy P, Atherly A, Flowers C. Prescription opiod usage 
and abuse relationships: an evaluation of state prescription drug 
monitoring program efficacy. Substance Abuse: Research and Treatment. 
2009;3:41-51. 
43. Prescription painkiller overdoses in the US. Vital Signs 2011; 
http://www.cdc.gov/VitalSigns/pdf/2011-11-vitalsigns.pdf. Accessed 
11/10/11. 
44. Hall A, Logan J, Toblin R, et al. Patterns of abuse among unintentional 
pharmaceutical overdose fatalities. Journal of the American Medical 
Association. 2008;300(22):2613-2620. 
45. Paulozzi LJ, Stier DD. Prescription drug laws, drug overdoses, and drug 
sales in New York and Pennsylvania. Journal of Public Health Policy. 
2010;31:422-432. 
 110 
46. Green TC, Zaller N, Rich J, Bowman S, Friedmann P. Revisiting Paulozzi 
et al.'s “Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and Death Rates from 
Drug Overdose”. Pain Medicine. 2011;12(6):982-985. 
47. Kerlikowske GIL, Jones CM, Labelle RM, Condon TP. Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs—Lack of Effectiveness or a Call to Action? Pain 
Medicine. 2011;12(5):687-689. 
48. Ulbrich T, Dula C, Green C, Porter K, Bennett M. Factors influencing 
communiy pharmacists' enrollment in a state prescription monitoring 
program. Journal of the American Pharmacists Association. 
2010;50(5):588-594. 
49. Goodin AJ, Blumenschein K, Freeman P, Talbert J. Consumer/Patient 
Encounters with Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: Evidence from a 
Medicaid Population. Pain Physician. 2012;15(3 Supp):ES169-ES175. 
50. Gilson A, Ryan K, Joranson D, Dahl J. A reassessment of trends in the 
medical use and abuse of opioid analgesics and implications for diversion 
control: 1997-2002. Journal of pain and symptom management. 
2004;28(2). 
51. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services Administration; Treatment 
Episode Data Set.  http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/webt/information.htm. 
52. Joranson DE, Carrow GM, Ryan KM, et al. Pain Management and 
Prescription Monitoring. Journal of pain and symptom management. 
2002;23(3):231-238. 
 111 
53. MIller M, Brown R. Prescription drug monitoring programs. American 
Family Physician. 2007;75(6):810-811. 
54. Turk D, Brody M, Okifuji E. Physicians’ attitudes and practices regarding 
the long-term prescribing of opioids for non-cancer pain. Pain. 
1994;59(2):201-208. 
55. Worley J. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, a Response to Doctor 
Shopping: Purpose, Effectiveness, and Directions for Future Research. 
Issues in Mental Health Nursing. 2012;33:319-328. 
56. Fass JA, Hardigan PC. Attitudes of Florida pharmacists toward 
implementing a state prescription drug monitoring program for controlled 
substances. Journal of Managed Care Pharmacy. 2011;17(6):430-438. 
57. Twillman R. Impact of prescription monitoring programs on prescription 
patterns and indicatiors of opioid abuse. Journal of Pain 2006;7(4):S6. 
58. Ross-Degnan D, Simoni-Wastila L, Brown J, et al. A controlled study of 
the effects of state surveillance on indicators of problematic and non-
problematic benzodiazepine use in a Medicaid population. Intl J Psych in 
Med. 2004;43(2):103-123. 
59. Birkland T. After Disaster: Agenda-Setting, Public Policy and Focusing 
Events. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; 1997. 
60. Kingdon J. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Second Edition ed. 
New York City, NY: Harper Collins; 1995. 
61. Rogers EM. Diffusion of Innovations, 4th Edition. New York, NY: The Free 
Press, A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc.; 1995. 
 112 
62. Mississippi. Public Health; Chapter 29: Poisons, Drugs, and Other 
Controlled Substances; Article 3: Uniform Controlled Substances Law. 41. 
Vol §41-29-117.2010. 
63. Kroener M. The battle over Oregon's prescription monitoring program. 
Oregon Public Broadcasting. Jan 13, 2014, 2014. 
64. Prescription Monitoring Information Exchange (PMIX). 2014; 
http://www.pdmpassist.org/content/prescription-drug-monitoring-
information-architecture-pmix. Accessed January 30, 2015. 
65. National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws. 2012; 
http://namsdl.org/home.htm. 
66. Meier KJ. Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch 
of Government. . New York: Harcourt-Brace; 1993. 
67. Brudney JL, Herbert FT. State Agencies and Their Environments: 
Examining the Influence of Important External Actors. Journal of Politics. 
1987;49:186-206. 
68. Heaney MT. Brokering Health Policy: Coalitions, Parties, and Interest 
Group Influence. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law. 
2006;31(5):888-944. 
69. Balla SJ, Wright JR. Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and 
Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy. American Journal of Political 
Science. 2001;45:799-812. 
 113 
70. Evaluation of Prescription Monitoring Program- Report to Legislature. 
2013; http://www.namsdl.org/library/13C56A3A-65BE-F4BB-
AFBC60BB7E847139/. 
71. Hanney SR, Gonzalez-Block MA, Buxton MJ, Kogan M. The utilization of 
health research in policy-making: concepts, examples, and methods of 
assessment. Health Research Policy and Systems. 2003;1(2). 
72. Balla SJ. Interstate Professional Associations and the Diffusion of Policy 
Innovations. American Politics Research. 2001;29(3):221-245. 
73. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Unintentional Causes of 
Death 1999-2010.  
http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/pdf/10LCID_Unintentional_Deaths_2010
-a.pdf. 
74. Jones Cm MKAPLJ. PHarmaceutical overdose deaths, united states, 
2010. JAMA. 2013;309(7):657-659. 
75. Simoni-Wastila L, Tompkins C. Balancing diversion control and medical 
necessity: the case of prescription drugs with abuse control. Substance 
Use & Misuse. 2001;36(9-10):1275-1296. 
76. Pollard M, Coster J. Savings for Medicaid Drug Spending. Health Affairs. 
1991;10(2):196-206. 
77. MEDICAID STATE DRUG UTILIZATION DATA: Web File Structure and 
Definitions. 2013; http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-
information/by-topics/benefits/prescription-
 114 
drugs/downloads/newrecordidsdudspecification.pdf. Accessed January 
30, 2014. 
78. Lied TR, Gonzalez J, Taparanskas W, Tejas S. Trends and Current Drug 
Utilization Patterns of Medicaid Beneficiaries. Health Care Financing 
Review. 2006;27:123-132. 
79. Law MR, Ross-Degnan D, Soumerai SB. Effect of Prior Authorization of 
Second-Generation Antipsychotic Agents on Pharmacy Utilization and 
Reimbursements. Psychiatric Services. 2008;59:540-546. 
80. Fischer MA, Schneeweiss S, Avorn J, Solomon DH. Medicaid Prior-
Authorization Programs and the Use of Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitors. New 
England Journal of Medicine. 2004;351:2187-2194. 
81. Roughead EE, Zhang F, Ross-Degnan D, Soumerai S. Differential Effect 
of Early or Late Implementation of Prior Authorization Policies on the Use 
of Cox II Inhibitors. Medical Care. 2006;44:378-382. 
82. Zerzan JT, Morden NE, Soumerai S, et al. Trends and Geographic 
Variation of Opiate Medication Use in State Medicaid Fee-For-Service 
Programs, 1996 to 2002. Medical Care. 2006;44:1005-1010. 
83. United States Food and Drug Administration. National Drug Code 
Directory.  
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm142438.htm. 
84. Wunsch MJ, Nakamoto K, Behonick G, Massello W. Opioid Deaths in 
Rural Virginia: A Description of the High Prevalence of Accidental 
Fatalities Involving Prescribed Medications. The American journal on 
 115 
addictions / American Academy of Psychiatrists in Alcoholism and 
Addictions. Jan–Feb 2009;18(1):5-14. 
85. Gammaitoni A, Fine P, Alvarez N, McPherson M, Bergmark S. Clinical 
Application of Opioid Equianalgesic Data. Clinical Journal of Pain. 
2003;19(5):286-297. 
86. Gordon D, Stevenson K, Griffie J, Muchka S, Rapp C, Ford-Roberts K. 
Opioid Equianalgesic Calculations. Journal of Palliative Medicine. 
2005;2(2):209-218. 
87. Shader R, Greenblatt D, Ciraulo D. Treatment of Dependence on 
Barbiturates, Benzodiazepines, and Other Sedative-Hypnotics. Manual of 
Psychiatric Therapeutics. Boston, MA: Little Brown; 1994. 
88. Koda-Kimble M, Young L, Kradjan W, Guglielmo B. Psychiatric Disorders. 
Applied Therapeutics: The Clnical Use of Drugs. Eighth Edition ed. 
Baltimore, MD: Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins; 2005. 
89. Sullivan M, Edlund M, Fan M, Devries A, Braden J, Martin B. Trends in 
use of opioids for non-cancer pain conditions 2000-2005 commercial and 
Medicaid insurance plans: The TROUP Study. Pain. 2008;138(2):440-449. 
90. Manchikanti L, Fellows B, Damron KS, Pampati V, McManus CD. 
Prevalence of Illicit Drug Use Among Individuals with Chronic Pain in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky: An Evaluation of Patterns and Trends. 
Journal of the Kentucky Medical Association. 2005;103(2):55-62. 
91. Sullivan MD, Edlund MJ, Fan M-Y, DeVries A, Brennan Braden J, Martin 
BC. Risks for possible and probable opioid misuse among recipients of 
 116 
chronic opioid therapy in commercial and medicaid insurance plans: The 
TROUP Study. PAIN. 8// 2010;150(2):332-339. 
92. Manchikanti L, Fellows B, Ailinani H, Pampati V. Therapeutic Use, Abuse, 
and Nonmedical Use of Opioids: A Ten-Year Perspective. Pain Physician. 
2010;13(5):401-435. 
93. Wilsey BL, Fishman SM, Gilson AM, et al. An analysis of the number of 
multiple prescribers for opioids utilizing data from the California 
Prescription Monitoring Program. Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug 
Safety. 2011. 
94. McDonald DC, Carlson KE. Estimating the Prevalence of Opioid Diversion 
by "Doctor Shoppers" in the United States. PLOS ONE. 2013;8(7):1-11. 
95. Stata Statistical Software: Release 13 [computer program]. College 
Station, TX: StataCorp LP; 2013. 
96. House Bill 1: An Act Relating to Controlled Substances, KRS § 218A.172 
(2012). 
97. Gilson A, Ryan KM, Joranson DE, Dahl J. A reassessment of trends in the 
medical use and abuse of opioid analgesics and implications for diversion 
control: 1997-2002. Journal of Pain Symptom Management. 
2004;28(2):176-178. 
98. Rosenblum A, Parrino M, Schnoli SH, et al. Prescription opioid abuse 
among enrollees into methadone maintenance treatment. Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence. 2007;90:64-71. 
 117 
99. Dobkin C, Nicosia N. The War on Drugs: Methamphetamine, Public 
Health, and Crime. American Economic Review. 2009;99(1):324-349. 
100. Scherlen R. The never-ending drug war: obstacles to drug war policy 
termination. PS, Political Science & Politics. 2012;45(1):67-73. 
101. Reuter P. Why has US drug policy changed so little over 30 years? Crime 
and Justice. 2013;42(1):75-140. 
102. Institutional Review Board Determination of Activities that Need IRB 
Review.  
http://www.research.uky.edu/ori/human/WhatNeedsIRBReview.htm. 
Accessed January 4, 2015. 
103. Ghitza UE, Tai B. Challenges and Opportunities for Integrating Preventive 
Substance-Use-Care Services in Primary Care through the Affordable 
Care Act. J Health Care Poor Underserved. 2014;25(10):36-45. 
104. Volkow ND, Frieden TR, Hyde PS, Cha SS. Medication-Assisted 
Therapies: Tackling the Opioid Overdose Epidemic. New England Journal 
of Medicine. 2014;370:2063-2066. 
105. Handal KA, Schauben JL, Salamone FR. Naloxone. Annals of Emergency 
Medicine. 7// 1983;12(7):438-445. 
106. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Vital signs: overdoses of 
prescription opioid pain relievers--United States, 1999-2008. MMWR 
Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report. 2011;60(43):1487-1492. 
 118 
107. Lagu T, Anderson BJ, Stein M. Overdoses among friends: drug users are 
willing to adminstered naloxone to others. Journal of Substance Abuse 
Treatment. 2006;30(2):129-133. 
108. Galea S, Worthington N, Piper T, Nandi V, Curtis M, Rosenthal D. 
Provision of naloxone injection drug users as an overdose prevention 
strategy: evidence from a pilot study. Addictive Behaviors. 2006;31:907-
912. 
109. Bachhuber MA, Saloner B, Cunningham CO, Barry CL. Medical cannabis 
laws and opioid analgesic overdose mortality in the united states, 1999-
2010. JAMA Internal Medicine. 2014;174(10):1668-1673. 
110. International Classification of Diseases 10.  
http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/. Accessed January 3, 2015. 
111. Vital Signs: Overdoses of prescription opioid pain relievers--United States, 
1999-2008. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 2011;60(43):1487-
1492. 
112. Paulozzi LJ, Xi Y. Recent changes in drug poisoning mortality in the 
United States by urban–rural status and by drug type. 
Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug Safety. 2008;17(10):997-1005. 
113. Research Protocol and Codebook for Naloxone Overdose Prevention 
Laws. National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Institutes of Health;2014. 
114. Death Certificate Data. Kentucky Office of Vital Statistics; 2014. 
 119 
115. Davis C, Webb D, Burris S. Changing law from barrier to facilitator of 
opioid overdose prevention. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics. 
2012;41(s1):33-36. 
116. Rosenbaum S. Medicaid Payments and Access to Care. New England 
Journal of Medicine. 2014;371(25):2345-2347. 
 120 
Amie J. Goodin 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Certificate in Informatics                      May 2012  
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 
 
Master of Public Policy                       May 2009  
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration, University of Kentucky, 
Lexington, KY  
 
Bachelor of Science                         May 2007  
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 
Majors: Biology, Sociology 
 
RESEARCH AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
Statistics and Research Design Consultant                                 2014-Present 
 
Research Scientist                                   2011-Present 
Institute for Pharmaceutical Outcomes and Policy, University of Kentucky. 
 
Academic Appointment, Instructor                    2012-2014 
Gatton College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky.  
 
Research Assistant                                2008-2011 
Institute for Pharmaceutical Outcomes and Policy, University of Kentucky.  
   
Internship                       2008-2010 
Money Follows the Person Program, Department of Medicaid Services, 
Frankfort, Kentucky.  
 
Teaching Assistant                                2007-2008  
College of Pharmacy, University of Kentucky.  
 
PUBLICATIONS  
 
Wixson S, Blumenschein K, Goodin AJ, Talbert J, and PR Freeman. (2015). 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Utilization in Kentucky Community 
Pharmacies. Pharmacy Practice 13(2): 540-552.  
 
Fallin A, Goodin AJ, Lee YO, and K Bennett. (2015). Smoking Cessation 
Awareness and Utilization among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
Adults: An Analysis of the 2009-2010 National Adult Tobacco Survey. Nicotine & 
 121 
Tobacco Research. E-pub ahead of print on May 25, 2015. doi: 
10.1093/ntr/ntv103. 
 
Hickson R, Perin N, Talbert J, Thornbury W, and AJ Goodin. (2015). Online 
Medical Care: The Current State of eVisits in Primary Care Delivery. 
Telemedicine and e-Health 21(2): 1-7. 
 
Fallin A, Goodin AJ, and B King. (2015). Menthol Cigarette Smoking among 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Adults in the U.S. American Journal of 
Preventive Medicine 48 (1): 93-97. 
 
Fallin A, Goodin AJ, Lee YO, and K Bennett. (2015). Smoking Characteristics 
Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults. Preventive Medicine 74: 123-130. 
 
Fallin A, Goodin AJ, Rayens MK, Morris S, and EJ Hahn. (2014). Smoke-Free 
Policy Implementation: Theoretical and Practical Considerations. Policy, Politics, 
& Nursing Practice 15(3-4): 81-92.  
 
Wixson S, Freeman PR, Blumenschein K, Talbert J, Goodin AJ, Higgins GE, 
and GF Vito. (2014). Law Enforcement Perceptions of a Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Program. International Journal of Police Science & Management 
16(4): 288-296. 
 
Monson K, Freeman PR, Goodin AJ, Talbert J, and K Blumenschein. (2014). 
Kentucky Pharmacist Opinions of the Potential Reclassification of 
Pseudoephedrine as a Legend Drug. Journal of the American Pharmacists 
Association 54(4): 391-405. 
 
Blumenschein, K and AJ Goodin. Measurement and Descriptive Analysis. In: 
Principles of Research Design and Drug Literature Evaluation, Aparasu R and J 
Bentley, eds. Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. Burlington, MA. March, 2014.  
 
Goodin AJ and J Talbert. Politics of Kentucky Pharmacy Regulation. In: 
Kentucky Government, Politics, and Public Policy, Clinger J and M Hail, eds. 
University Press of Kentucky. Lexington, KY. November, 2013. 
 
Goodin AJ Blumenschein K, Freeman P, and J Talbert. (2012). 
Consumer/Patient Encounters with Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: 
Evidence from a Medicaid Population. Pain Physician 15(3S): 169-175.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122 
AWARDS AND HONORS 
  
Date Activity  
2014 Best Poster Award (first author Sarah Wixson), International Society 
of Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research. 
2014 University of Kentucky Graduate School Travel and Research 
Funding Grant: $800. 
2014 Thomas D. Clark Medallion awarded to Kentucky Government, 
Politics, and Public Policy, by Thomas D. Clark Foundation. 
2013 Best Student Podium Presentation Award, International Society of 
Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research. 
2013 University of Kentucky Graduate School Travel and Research 
Funding Grant: $400.  
2013 Second Place Poster Award: Rho Chi Society Research Day, 
University of Kentucky College of Pharmacy. 
2007 Graduated Cum Laude Biology, University of Kentucky. 
2007 Graduated Cum Laude Sociology, University of Kentucky. 
2002-2007 Governor’s Scholars Presidential Award and Scholarship. 
 
 
